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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: EFFORTS TO
PENETRATE BANK SECRECY IN SWITZER-
LAND FROM 1940 TO 1975
JAMES T. KELLY*
Swiss bankers have traditionally interpreted their pledge of
secrecy very broadly. While this interpretation has helped their
business to grow, it has not always acted completely in their favor.
There have been repeated attacks from abroad against the so-called
"gnomes of Zurich," and over the past forty years, a variety of
industrialized and emerging nations have sought to penetrate Swiss
bank secrecy. These nations have ranged from Nazi Germany to
Israel, and from the United Kingdom to various Latin American
nations. In this respect, any American charges that Swiss bank
secrecy is an ingenious arrangement designed by the Swiss to
facilitate the avoidance of American laws is nothing new to the
Swiss. The issue is an important one for Swiss-American relations,
however, because it has generated friction which spoils the friend-
ship that has traditionally existed between the two democracies.
This article is organized to discuss the United States' efforts,
over the past thirty-five years, to penetrate Swiss bank secrecy.
I. AN OVERVIEW
The first assault on Swiss bank secrecy came at the end of
World War II, when American policy was devoted to preventing a
German economic recovery and a Nazi resurgence. As the United
States sought to track down German funds believed to be hidden in
the neutral countries, it clashed with the Swiss over bank secrecy
for the first time.
The second attempt also had its origin in World War II, when
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the United States government seized and vested in itself title to all
enemy property located within its territory. The single largest
such seizure, constituting 20% of all enemy assets vested during
the war, involved a corporation which the United States said was
German-owned, but which the shareholders insisted was Swiss-
owned. Litigation concerning Swiss bank secrecy stalled the case
at the discovery stage for twenty years.
The final round, lasting from 1965 to the present, originated
from American officials' concern with the extensive abuse of Swiss
bank secrecy by American criminals to evade American laws. The
scope of this problem will be discussed, and the various remedial
steps analyzed.
To appreciate the basis for the American position, one must
realize that the confidentiality of a bank customer's records is much
more narrowly defined under the American system than under the
Swiss laws. While American bankers do recognize that such
records are protected from disclosure to private party outsiders,
they cooperate extensively with government officials requesting
information about a depositor.
Banks have regularly afforded government agents informal
access to customer records without notifying the customer to
whom the records pertain. Even when legal process is di-
rected to the bank, protection for customers is inadequate,
for banks regularly comply without notifying them. Banks
have little incentive to protect the privacy interests of their
customers through engaging in litigation to contest the valid-
ity of a subpoena, but they do have an incentive to cooperate
with the Government, which heavily regulates the banking
industry.'
Officials accustomed to such deference at home were simply unpre-
pared for a much tougher policy against disclosure in Switzerland.
A. The Scope of Bank Secrecy
The Swiss banker's obligation of secrecy has its roots in the
private law of the sixteenth century. The obligation was first
recognized as customary law which arose from the Swiss views on
the importance of protecting personal freedom. Later develop-
1. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 41, 193 (1974) (foot-
notes omitted). See Bailin, Banks Ordinarily Cooperate with IRS in Tax Exami-
nation of Customers, 14 J. TAXATION 220 (1961). But see United States v. Miller,
500 F.2d 751, 756-58 (5th Cir. 1974), 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
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ments stressed the banker's duty of loyalty and the customer's right
to personal privacy. Confidentiality exists as an implied contract
between banker and customer, and does not depend upon an
express agreement. The right to invoke banking secrecy is granted
both to Swiss nationals and foreigners, and the latter category
includes customers and banks operating within Switzerland.'
The concept of the banking secret was first codified in 1934,
after the Nazis took power in Germany.' At that time, the Gesta-
po was attempting to gain access to information from Swiss banks
on the financial affairs of German Jews and other "enemies of the
state," to determine if they had violated German law by removing
funds from Germany. The Swiss government acted in order to
guarantee depositors protection against such threats. Article
47(b) of the Banking Law of 1934 reads:
Anyone who in his capacity as an officer or employee
of a bank, or as an auditor or his employee, or as a member
of the Banking Commission or as an officer or employee of
its bureau intentionally violates his duty to observe silence
or his professional rule of secrecy or anyone who induces or
attempts to induce a person to commit any such offense, shall
be liable to a fine of up to 20,000 francs or imprisonment
for up to six months, or both.
,If the offender acted with negligence, he shall be liable
to a fine up to 10,000 francs.
4
In addition to the criminal penalty, the breach of banking secrecy
may also lead to a suit for damages under article 97 of the Code of
Obligations.5
Banking secrecy in Switzerland covers all information of a
business or personal nature, of which the bank gains knowledge in
connection with business transactions and consultations with cus-
tomers. The customer remains the "master of the secret" and
upon his request, the bank is obliged to produce all information
relating to his transactions. Without such a customer request,
2. See Mueller, The Swiss Banking Secret-From a Legal View, 18 INT'L
& CoMP. L.Q. 360 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Mueller].
3. Id. at 361.
4. Federal Law of November 8, 1934, Regarding Banks and Savings Institu-
tions, based on Art. 31 Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (Bundesuer fas-
sung der Schweizerischen Eidgen ossen schaft, Constitution de la Confederation
Suisse).
5. Swiss Code of Obligations, art. 97. (Schweizerische Obligationenrecht
(OR), Code des Obligations (CO)).
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however, the bank is prohibited from disclosing information to
third parties, whether private individuals or government officials.6
Narrow exceptions to banking secrecy do exist under Swiss
law. In this respect, banking secrecy differs from the absolute
professional secrecy granted by law to Swiss attorneys, clergymen,
and physicians. While Article 47(b) of the Banking Law sets a
criminal penalty for the breach of banking secrecy, it does not
identify the cases in which a bank has a right or duty to give
information. Those cases are defined by other statutory provi-
sions, and by court decisions under the various cantonal and
federal procedural rules.
Although banking secrecy is a personal right of the individual
enforceable under private contract law, overriding principles
of public law may oblige the bank to disclose information
under circumstances where the interests of the public out-
weigh those of the person. . . . The Swiss public interest
has provided exceptions to the bankers' obligation of secrecy
in cases involving heirs, family law, debt collection and bank-
ruptcy, international money transfers, and criminal conduct. 7
The most important of the exceptions, for American purposes, has
been criminal conduct.
B. Preliminary Observations
Three comments seem in order. First, Switzerland is the
most important of the world's banking secrecy jurisdictions, but it
is far from being the only one. Other nations having similar
secrecy requirements include the Bahamas, Curacao, Hong Kong,
Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Panama and West Germany. Many
of these jurisdictions have patterned their banking codes to some
extent upon the Swiss prototype, in the hopes of building a solid
banking industry. While they may have copied the banking secre-
cy laws, they cannot match Switzerland's long-standing political
neutrality, government stability, sound currency or efficient invest-
ment management.
Second, bank secrecy protects every Swiss account. "Coded"
or "numbered" accounts are an internal device used by the banks
to protect customers from indiscretions by members of their staff.8
6. Mueller, supra note 2, at 363.
7. Note, Secret Foreign Bank Accounts, 6 TEXAs INT'L L.F. 105, 119
(1970) (footnotes omitted).
8. 213 The Economist 1276 (1964).
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Numbered accounts insure that only a few of the bank's officers
know the true identity of a customer; no anonymity exists between
the banker and the depositor, only secrecy with respect to outsid-
ers. The numbered account is legally irrelevant if the bank is
required by Swiss law to reveal information under court order.9
One estimate indicates that such accounts require a minimum
opening deposit of $25,000 and that they represent no more than
three or four percent of the total number of Swiss accounts and less
than 10% of the deposit volume.' ° For the remainder of this
article, the author will ignore the distinction between numbered
and regular accounts.
Third, Swiss banks exercise a far wider range of services than
do American banks. In addition to performing such standard
functions as accepting deposits and making loans, they act as
stockbrokers, underwriters, and mutual fund managers, and may
even own controlling interests in industrial companies. When
Swiss banks serve as financial intermediaries for their customers,
they do so via "omnibus accounts" registered in the bank's name
only. Bank secrecy thus conceals the identity of the real party in
interest for whom the bank is acting.
II. UNITED STATES' EFFORTS TO PENETRATE SWISS
BANK SECRECY IN 1945-1946
A. Background of American Policy
American foreign policy towards Switzerland during World
War II combined the economic warfare tactics used against all the
European neutrals (as an indirect method of striking at Germany)
with a New Deal politician's distrust for Swiss corporate and
banking law. Not surprisingly, Swiss-American relations were
severely strained during the period.
The economic warfare policy had two objectives. The first
was to eliminate all trade between the European neutrals and the
Axis, in order to deny the Axis strategic materials. The second
was to prevent Axis flight capital and looted property from finding
a "safe haven" in the neutral countries from which a German
economic recovery might spring.
Since the Swiss economy was heavily dependent upon interna-
9. Mueller, supra note 2, at 362.
10. U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP'T, Feb. 21, 1972, at 61.
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tional trade, the American policy struck it particularly hard. As
the war progressed, Switzerland became increasingly dependent
upon various strategic supplies such as petroleum, food items and
industrial raw materials which could only be obtained from over-
seas. The United States exploited its control over these supplies to
negotiate a series of wartime concessions with the European neu-
trals.
The United States supplemented its economic blockade by
blacklisting1 firms in neutral countries suspected of aiding the
Axis, and by twin domestic programs of "foreign funds control"
and "alien property custody." More than 1,800 Swiss firms were
blacklisted, while $1.2 billion of Swiss assets within the United
States were frozen, effective July, 1941, five months before the
United States became a belligerent.
The second objective of American policy was directed at
preventing a German economic recovery following the impending
military defeat. Many individuals within the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration felt that Germany's military defeat in World War II would
be viewed within Germany as a temporary setback, and that a third
attempt at world domination was inevitable.
12
Destroying the German economy required simultaneous ac-
tion along a number of lines. The major areas of American
concern were the Axis economic penetration of Latin America, the
11. A blacklisted firm was prevented from obtaining export licenses, funds,
passport visas, and the use of communications facilities. At its peak, the Ameri-
can blacklist contained over 15,400 names. It remained in effect against Swiss
firms from July 17, 1941, until November 30, 1946.
12. The Morgenthau Plan, formulated by Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treas-
ury and adopted as official American policy, called for creation of an agricultural
Germany. The Ruhr was to be destroyed as an industrial area and then adminis-
tered as an international zone. German schools and media were to be shut down
until "appropriate programs" were formulated. There was to be no German na-
tional government, only local governments which would deal with the military oc-
cupation commission. German world trade would be regulated for twenty years
by the United Nations.
The Morgenthau Plan was never implemented. It was abandoned when it
became evident that the biggest threat to world peace was not a conquered Ger-
many, but rather the growing Cold War between Soviet and American blocs.
Like Morgenthau, Senator Harley M. Kilgore believed that a defeated Ger-
many was still a major threat to world peace. As Chairman of the Sub-Com-
mittee on War Mobilization of the Senate's Military Affairs Committee (the Kil-
gore Committee), he repeatedly dramatized this point. Within two months of
Germany's unconditional surrender, Kilgore reported that the German cartelists
("the co-conspirators of the German Army and the Nazi Party") could form the
economic basis for renewed warfare if they were permitted to survive.
Vol. 6
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question of German cartels, combines, and technology, and the
tracking down and frustration of German efforts to hide funds
abroad for another attempt at world conquest. It was the third of
these areas which created the Swiss-American tensions in 1945 and
1946, when America's "Safehaven Program" clashed with Switzer-
land's bank secrecy laws.
The Safehaven Program was a combined effort by the State
Department, the Treasury Department and the Foreign Economic
Administration to forestall German attempts to hide assets outside
Germany in neutral European countries.1 3 The program was
designed to deny to Germany the economic power arising from the
organized looting of occupied countries, the flight of German capi-
tal in anticipation of defeat and the German capital investment
already located abroad when the war began.
Safehaven received an international endorsement from the
1944 United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bret-
ton Woods, New Hampshire. Resolution VI of that Conference1"
observed that the German transfer of assets abroad jeopardized the
United Nations' efforts to permanently maintain peaceful interna-
tional relations. It called upon the forty-four signatory govern-
ments to urge the neutrals to prevent such concealment and to
facilitate the return of such property to proper authorities.
It should be clear that Allied economic warfare tactics dealt
harshly with the European neutrals, and that a certain amount of
Swiss-American ill-will could arise from these policies alone. Un-
fortunately, the trend was further influenced by the inflexible
financial attitudes of certain New Deal politicians, most notably,
Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury, Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr.
One writer comments:
Many [in Washington] looked on the Swiss corporate struc-
ture, with its holding companies, lack of antitrust laws, and
complete freedom from government regulation with distaste,
or even considered it immoral. From this general bias came a
feeling . . . that Nazis . . . were using Swiss banks to cover
up their global operations. . . . Switzerland and its banks
• . . had a good image and could cover nicely for the more
unsavory Nazi one. . . . There was a certain amount of
13. Clayton, Security Against Renewed German Aggression, 13 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 21, 27-33 (1945).
14. United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Final Act and Re-
lated Documents (U.S. Dep't of State Pub. 2187, Conference Series 55, 1944).
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this going on-but it never approached the extent which
Treasury officials darkly imagined. . . . The Nazis were al-
ways almost pathologically suspicious of their own people's
dealings through Swiss banks or Swiss fronts, and permitted
it to take place only under limited circumstances.
15
B. The Bern Agreements, February 1945
After the adoption of Bretton Woods Resolution VI, six
months of diplomatic follow-up by the United States legation in
Bern produced only limited response from the Swiss government.
The State Department then instituted more positive action and
disclosed a series of bilateral economic negotiations between the
Allies and the individual European neutrals. The first of these
talks were held with Spain and Sweden. In January, 1945, Secre-
tary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr., announced that Lauchlin Cur-
rie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, would lead a
Special Mission to Switzerland to re-evaluate the Allied-Swiss eco-
nomic relationship.
The Currie mission had three objectives: to halt Swiss trade
with Germany, to eliminate German coal shipments by rail through
Switzerland to German-controlled factories in northern Italy, and
to obtain Swiss acceptance of Bretton Woods Resolution VI. Be-
fore arriving in Switzerland, the American delegation held prelimi-
nary talks with British and French officials in London and Paris.
The results of these talks enabled the three nations, acting on
behalf of all the Allies, to present a unified bargaining position to
the Swiss. 6
Negotiations were conducted in Bern in February and March,
1945. Since the Allies held the clearly superior bargaining posi-
tion, it is not surprising that virtually all of their objectives were
achieved. However, the seeming ease with which bank secrecy fell
to the demands under Resolution VI deserves comment.
The initial reaction of the Swiss government and press to the
American economic warfare policies was one of displeasure and
alarm. There was concern that the United States was disregarding
the Swiss economic and material survival needs, in order to defeat
15. T. FEHRENBACH, THE Swiss BANKS 74 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
FtEBENBACH].
16. Dingle M. Foote, Parliamentary Secretary to the British Ministry of
Economic Warfare, and Emil Guionin, of the French Ministry of Finance, were
the other Allied representatives.
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Germany. The Swiss were relieved by a compromise which per-
mitted them to retain their neutrality and to continue a limited non-
strategic materials trade with Germany.
[A] number of influential Swiss bankers proposed that the
Confederation would have to make some concessions. The
Swiss were aware that the United States was now not just
a distant great power, but the dominant power in Europe.
In this sense, the United States had replaced the Germans.
In banks and in the Nationalrat it was agreed that the bank-
ing secret could be breached in some respects due to the un-
usual circumstances. Public-and not just banking-opinion
in Switzerland was strongly against any breaking of bank se-
crecy. But public opinion was also behind the American pur-
pose, which was the final destruction of the Nazi empire.
17
A major Swiss concession on bank secrecy was offered on
February 17, 1945. The Swiss Federal Council drafted a decree
which blocked all German holdings in Switzerland, pending an
examination of individual accounts, in order to determine whether
the Allied accusations had any foundation in fact. Article IX of
the decree partially rescinded the bank secrecy law by permitting
the Swiss Clearing Office, a quasi-governmental agency which had
supervised all Swiss-German wartime trade, to receive from Swiss
banks information necessary to determine the rightful owners of
property.18
Swiss Clearing Office officials were not allowed to enter a
Swiss bank unless the bank's officials first reported that German
assets were held. The burden of proof was placed upon a suspect-
ed account-holder to disprove any German taint, and mandatory
disclosure by bank officers was enforced by a maximum penalty of
a 10,000 franc fine and one year in prison. The decree froze all
assets belonging to persons domiciled in Germany or their repre-
sentatives in Switzerland, including those of Swiss holding compa-
nies. It impounded all German bank balances, halted all ship-
ments of German gold into Switzerland, and began a census of all
German assets in Switzerland.
The compromise seemed reasonable to both sides in view of
the emergency wartime circumstances. Chief American negotiator
Currie wrote two months later:
17. FEEmimcBH, supra note 15, at 82.
18. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1945, at 16, col. 3.
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We had good reason to believe that Switzerland had become
the favorite safe haven for Nazi financial resources. This
arose partly from proximity, partly from the world-wide ram-
ifications of Swiss financial and industrial enterprises, and
partly from the Swiss bank secrecy laws, which gave peculiar
and unique protection to the cloaking of financial interests.
In this. . . the Nazis made grave miscalculations. The
Swiss government has definitely decided . . that . . . it will
. . . not permit its facilities to be used as a cloak for post-
war Nazi financial operations.
We feel we can rely upon the honest and very efficient
Swiss Government Administration to insure that the job will
be well done and that few German assets will escape dis-
closure. 19
C. Relations Deteriorate, April 1945-March 1946
Currie's optimism was not widely shared in Washington.
American policy towards Switzerland between April, 1945, and
March, 1946, was marked by an unfortunate series of undiplomat-
ic insults, intensified economic warfare, and renewed demands for
the disclosure and liquidation of German external assets. Mutual
understanding was further weakened by press coverage in both
nations which failed to educate public opinion concerning the two
governments' respective positions, and which often proved to be
inflammatory.
Soon after the German surrender, .Allied investigating teams,
staffed in part by American Treasury agents, began to scour Ger-
many for evidence of the German side of Safehaven transactions.
When the Swiss Clearing Office announced in the autumn of 1945
that its census of German assets totaled $250 million, the Allied
investigators in Germany suggested that the true amount was $750
million. The Swiss requested to view the Allies' evidence to aid
their investigation, but were told that all sources were confidential.
There was even an oblique request that Allied investigators be
permitted to enter Switzerland. In Washington, the Kilgore Com-
mittee charged the Swiss with violating the Bern Agreements. The
accusation was based upon captured German correspondence, the
accuracy of which was soon challenged, but angry and immediate
19. Currie, Tumbling the Nazi Financial Redoubt, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29,
1945, § 6 (Magazine), at 10.
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Swiss denials indicated that severe damage to goodwill had result-
ed.2
0
Economic warfare against Switzerland intensified after the
German surrender. Longstanding tactics such as the blockade,
blacklist, and freezing and vesting of Swiss assets in the United
States remained in force. In addition, new tools were employed. A
State Department policy bluntly subordinated the supply needs of
European neutrals to the requirements of the liberated nations.'
1
And when in December, 1945, the United States removed the
freeze on trade in Europe in order to stimulate economic recovery,
the European neutrals were excluded "to assure that camouflaged
enemy assets were not released. 22
Renewed demands for the disclosure and liquidation of Ger-
man external assets came indirectly from the United States via
international channels. The Potsdam Conference agreed that the
Allied Control Council for Germany (the military occupation gov-
ernment) should dispose of German external assets not already
under Allied control.2" On September 20, 1945, the Council pro-
claimed that all property belonging to German residents but situat-
ed outside of Germany was frozen. This was followed on October
30, 1945, by Control Council Law No. 5, which purported to vest
in the Council's German External Property Commission all rights
to the property frozen by the earlier proclamation. 24 At issue was
the power of a military occupation government to dispose of prop-
erty of private citizens as well as of the conquered Nazi regime, and
the source of its jurisdiction over property outside the territory
actually occupied.
[Tihough not intended as such, [these laws were] a direct
attack on both Swiss domestic law and Swiss sovereignty.
• . . Swiss jurists informed the Nationalrat to stand fast.
They said that no international tribunal would uphold the
provisions of [these laws]. . . . [B]oth British and American
jurists gave exactly the same opinion to their governments.
It was no accident that the Swiss demanded, and the Allies
20. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1945, at 1, col. 7; id., Nov. 17, 1945, at 2, col.
2.,
21. Lovitt, Survey oj Economic Policy Toward the European Neutrals, 13
DEP'T STATE BULL. 777, 780 (1945).
22. U.S. Treasury Department Press Release No. V-155 (Dec. 7, 1945).
23. Mann, German External Assets, 24 Brarr. Y.B. INT'L L. 239 (1947).
24. Id. at 239-40, n.4 & n.5.
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refused, to place the matter before the newly-formed World
Court. 25
Still another demand for Swiss disclosure arose from the
January, 1946 Paris Reparations Agreement of ,the Western Al-
lies.2 6  Article 6(b) of that Agreement called again for the liqui-
dation of German assets held in neutral countries. Britain, France
and the Uzited States were authorized ito negotiate with the neu-
trals on the matter. After discussions with Spain and Portugal, the
Allies turned to Switzerland.
D. The Washington Accord, March-May 1946
The governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United
States and Switzerland negotiated the question of Genan ,external
assets once again from March 18 to May 26, 194.6. The leading
figures during the talks were Randolph Pau, Special Assistant to
President Truman, for the Allie, and Walter Stucki, Chief of
Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Political Department.
2 7
'The Allies requested the iSwiss to liquidate the Germn hold-
ings in Switzerland which had -been frozen since the Bern Agree-
ments, in (order to turn Ithe prooeeds over to 'the Inter-Allied
ReparationsAgency. The Allies' ;aim 'was ,to remove the lneat Pf
German economic xecovery while financing ,the ,repair ,of (JVerwan-
,caused war damage. The Allies (exercise4 considerable economic
leverage to-support their-positio.
The Swiss were quite willing to -restore all looted rWoperty to
its original owners, !but argud that blocked tGerman assets in
Switzerland should be used in satisfaction of Swiss pitizens! claims
against Germany. ,The value of such claims -far e eded the
amount available. The ;Swiss mwanted an end ito Allied ,eoonomic
warfare, and the opportunity to participate in he European finan-
cial recovery. Side disputes arose invelng'the -scope ,of the assets,
such as vwhether'pre-Nai 'assets of -private German citizens and life
savings of (erman refugees ,sm-qggled oat of 'Germany bfore the
war should be included With Nazi flight capital'in the census.
25. 'FERENBACH, supra note 15, at 86.
26. Draft Agreement on Rcparation from Germany, on the Establishment
of an Inter-Allied Reparations Agency and on jhe,Restitution of 'Monetary Gold,
art. 6, 14 DEP'T STA E BUtLL. 114, 117 (194.6),.
27. Paul had previously.served .as r3enerl Counsel for the Treasury'Depart-
ment. F.W. McCombe, Counselor for the British Embassy .in u'Washiington, and
Paul Chargueraud of the French Foreign Office were the other major participants.
Val. 6
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Initial negotiation progressed slowly, and nearly collapsed
several times. The delegates created three subcommittees to deal,
respectively, with looted property and gold, claims against Germa-
ny, and liquidation and disposition procedures. The Swiss recog-
nized that their claim for debts due from wartime trade with
Germany was morally weak since such trade had helped Germany
to wage the war, and they agreed to absorb these losses internally.
The Allies compromised their claims as well. If the Swiss would
vigorously pursue German assets in Switzerland, the proceeds so
recovered would be divided, part to the claims of Swiss citizens for
pre-war trade with Germany, and the balance to the Allies for the
rehabilitation of the devastated countries.
James Byrnes, the new Secretary of State, became concerned
about the steady souring of Swiss-American relations during
1945 and 1946 ...
The U.S. was damaging its relations with a friendly
power over an issue which in practical terms was no longer
relevant and from which it stood to get not one red cent ...
A surprisingly bitter underground power struggle between the
State and Treasury officialdom was waged through Washing-
ton corridors. It resulted in standoff and compromise. Be-
cause of this, the U.S. modified its position toward Dr. Stucki
during March.
28
Stucki returned to Switzerland to confer with his government.
Although there was strong sentiment in Switzerland against any
compromise, general terms were arranged; informal agreement was
reached on May 21, 1946, and letters of. understanding were
exchanged on May 25, 1946.29
There were four main provisions to the Washington Accord.
First, German holdings in Switzerland subject to repatriation (in-
cluding refugee assets) were to be identified and liquidated by the
Swiss Clearing Office. The Allies agreed to make known all
available background information and to suggest avenues of in-
quiry. Doubtful or controversial cases were subject to preliminary
administrative review by a three-member Swiss Authority of Re-
view and, if necessary, to arbitration.
Second, liquidation proceeds were to be divided equally be-
tween the Allies and the Swiss. The Allied share would then be
turned over to the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency for the rehabil-
28. FEHRENBACH, supra note 15, at 91-92.
29. 14 DEP'T SrATE BULL. 1121 (1946).
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itation of countries devastated or depleted by Germany during the
war.
Third, Switzerland agreed to make available $58.1 million in
gold, in restitution for gold alleged to have been wrongfully taken
by Germany from occupied countries during the war and trans-
ferred to Switzerland. Gold so received would be placed in the
gold pool established by the Paris Reparations Agreement, to be
divided pro rata among the countries from which gold was looted.
Fourth, the Allies agreed to discontinue their blacklists
against Swiss firms, and the United States agreed to release Swiss
assets in the United States, by determining the necessary proce-
dures without delay.
The Swiss parliament ratified the Washington Accord in June,
1946. Unfreezing Swiss assets within the United States took some-
what longer. On November 30, 1946, a certification agreement
was negotiated between the two governments which permitted the
return of $1.2 billion in Swiss funds which had been frozen since
July, 1941.1o As was the case with the Bern Agreements a year
earlier, the Washington Accord was viewed by both governments
as a practical solution to an otherwise-insoluble problem. The
Swiss had negotiated from an inferior bargaining position, and yet
had preserved their sovereignty, neutrality and even most of their
bank secrecy.
No Swiss government agency or official was allowed to enter
a Swiss bank unless the banker reported that German assets
were held. The census was voluntary. The German assets
transferred or liquidated consisted for the most part of Ger-
man-held companies where the ownership could be traced.
Where a firm had "protective coloring" the Swiss followed
their own law. If cantonal law said a company was Swiss,
it was Swiss."'
The Accord was discharged, with respect to German assets in
Switzerland owned by residents of the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny (West Germany), in August, 1952. This involved a lump-sum
payment of 121 million Swiss francs to the Allies. In addition, the
Swiss promised to give "sympathetic consideration" to asset claims
30. Once the Treasury Department unfroze the assets, individual claimants
still had to be certified by the Swiss Clearing Office.
31. FE tENBACH, supra note 15, at 93.
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on behalf of the victims of Nazi persecution, in the event that such
assets were found in Switzerland.
3 2
m11. THM INTERHANDEL CASE, 1925-1965
A. Origin of the Problem, 1925-1945
According to various estimates, between one-third and one-
half of world trade was subject to some degree of cartel control
during the era between World Wars I and H.11 Many business
managers viewed Switzerland as the ideal headquarters for such
cartels, given its established neutrality, and freedom from financial
restriction.
German corporations with international business found Switz-
erland attractive during the 1920s for these traditional reasons, as
well as for additional motives. The Weimar Republic was proving
unable to control the galloping inflation that was making the
German mark a worthless currency. It was likewise unsuccessful
in maintaining civil order in the face of Communist and Nazi party
growth. Finally, strong anti-German feelings throughout the
world made it prudent for German cartels to mask their foreign
dealings via Swiss incorporation.
1. The growth of I.G. Farben. When Edward Greutert
opened his private bank in 1920 in Basel, Switzerland, it was the
first to be capitalized exclusively with foreign money. 4 Five years
later, Hermann Schmitz of Frankfurt, Germany, merged the six
largest German chemical and dye companies into a new corpora-
32. 27 DEP'T STATE BULL. 363 (1952).
33. P. ELLSWORTH, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 136-37 (3d ed. 1966).
34. Greutert was a Swiss citizen who had worked before World War I for
Metallgesellschaft A.G. (Metall A.G.) in Germany. The original capitalization
for his bank was provided by Metal A.G. Upon his death, the bank carried the
name of his successor, Hans Sturzenegger.
Schmitz had been Greutert's co-worker for Metall A.G., and subsequently be-
came a Privy Councilor to Hitler. In 1947-48 at Nuremburg, he and 23 other
Farben officials were tried as war criminals. They were charged with following
corporate policies to plan the aggressive German war effort and to use concentra-
tion camp labor in meeting industrial production quotas. Schmitz was acquitted
on the major charges, but convicted of "plundering other industries," and given
a four year prison term. See generally J. Dunois, THE DEVIL'S CHEMISTS (1952)
[hereinafter cited as DuBoIs].
One theme of this article is that most "Swiss" banks causing friction between
the United States and Switzerland are foreign-owned banks, incorporated in Switz-
erland to exploit Swiss law. See text associated with footnotes 73-79, infra.
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tion called Internationale Gesellschaft Farbenindustrie A.G., or
I.G. Farben.
Farben grew steadily by acquiring or merging with other
German firms and foreign corporations. By 1929, it produced all
German dyes, chemicals, photographic supplies, nitrogen, pharma-
ceuticals, rayons and synthetics. By 1939, it had become the larg-
est chemical corporation in the world.
Schmitz steered Farben's business through the private Swiss
bank of Greutert and Cie., and eventually purchased a controlling
interest in the bank. He then proceeded to mask Farben owner-
ship and interests in various international businesses by establish-
ing a number of dummy Swiss corporations and accounts in the
Greutert bank. He used these to buy and sell control of each other
in a complex circle of options, pledges and loans, all of which were
protected by Swiss bank secrecy from the scrutiny of outsiders.
Max Ilgner, a Farben director and Schmitz nephew, organ-
ized a New York holding company in 1929, named American I.G.
Chemical Corp. This company owned Farben's American busi-
nesses, including Winthrop Chemical Co., Ozalid Corp., General
Aniline Works and Agfa-Ansco Corp. In 1931, flgner formed a
second New York corporation called Chemnyco to handle Farben's
patent arrangements with American firms. The Justice Depart-
ment began to investigate Chemnyco in 1937 for alleged antitrust
violations.
To forestall this investigation, Schmitz instituted a number of
changes in the American I.G. Chemical Corp. It became General
Aniline and Film Corp. (GAF), a Delaware corporation. He also
sold Farben's GAF stock. In 1928, Schmitz had organized a
Swiss holding company, named Internationale Gesellschaft fur
Chemische Unternehmungen A.G., or I.G. Chemie, whose sole
purpose was to hold, in Basel, controlling interest in Farben enter-
prises abroad. The beneficial ownership of I.G. Chemie stock was
blended into the Greutert-Sturzenegger Circle, discussed above,
and I.G. Chemie eventually came into control of 89% of the stock
of GAF.35
35. While Schmitz had indeed sold Farben's stock in GAF, a memorandum
captured after the war indicated that an option existed for Farben, through
Schmitz, to repurchase GAF from I.G. Chemie at any time. Chemie also agreed
never to sell to anyone but Farben. See Dunois, supra note 34, at 43.
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The exact chain of title by which I.G. Chemie claimed control
of GAF could not be traced without access to the Greutert bank
records. In the public mind, however, several factors linked GAF
with I.G. Farben. First, GAF officers appeared to be Farben-
dominated; a majority of the GAF board of directors were Farben
officers, and some were Schmitz relatives. Second, Farben
pledged that holders of I.G. Chemie stock would receive dividends
equal to those payable on Farben shares. In return, Farben
retained an option to buy all I.G. Chemie stock on call, at book
value. Third, the absence of fair market value consideration on
many Farben-I.G.Chemie-GAF transfers suggested that they were
not made by arms-length bargaining, but were merely shifts from
one Farben pocket to another.
As World War II approached, it became even more necessary
for German firms to divest or cloak their assets abroad. Farben
wanted to prevent its physical assets, patents and technology from
falling into enemy hands. To accomplish this result, Schmitz
resigned as Chairman of I.G. Chemie, and one-third of the GAF
common stock held by I.G. Chemie was returned to GAF. Own-
ership of I.G. Chemie stock by German nationals was reduced from
28% to 15%, and the dividend guarantee was cancelled. Farben-
owned patents, used by GAF on license, were sold outright to
GAF.
2. The United States seizure of GAF. Farben was never di-
rectly tied to GAF as a stockholder of record. The ties were in-
direct, at most, although virtually everyone conceded that I.G.
Chemie, the Swiss holding company which controlled GAF, was
initially "Farben-organized." But that fact was not at issue. The
question was whether Farben's ownership of I.G. Chemie had ter-
minated or had merely been concealed. The United States govern-
ment believed the latter to be the case, and soon after it entered the
war, seized GAF as enemy property.
The government's seizure and vesting of GAF was influenced
by factors apart from the merits of the case, however. GAF
became, quite by accident, the key to a struggle for control of
economic warfare policy among President Roosevelt's cabinet offi-
cers. The in-fighting dominated policy formulation from mid-
1940 to mid-1942, and involved the Secretaries of State and Trea-
sury, and the Attorney General, who together formed a committee
to supervise or eliminate undesirable influences in foreign-owned
or foreign-dominated businesses within the United States.
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The first phase of the battle matched Treasury Secretary
Morgenthau against Secretary of State Cordell Hull over the devel-
opment and scope of American economic warfare policies. An
April, 1941 compromise permitted the freezing of foreign funds
within the United States, to be accomplished on an ad hoc basis
keeping pace with the German conquest of Europe. This program
was expanded in June, 1941, to freeze funds of all European
belligerents, and again in July, 1941, to regulate foreign trade as
well as funds and to regulate neutrals as well as belligerents.
Management of the foreign funds control program was lodged in
,the Treasury, which quickly evolved 'the program into an economic
warfare board. It began licensing or direct management of
foreign-dominated firms operating within the United States.
This triggered round two of the struggle over the administra-
tion of economic warfare policy. Attorney General Francis Biddle
argued that property management (as distinct from funds control)
should be supervised by the Justice Department's Alien Property
Custodian, as had been done during World War I. He felt that
any other disposition would be inefficient. Morgenthau contended
that his Foreign Funds Control staff had developed an expertise in
the field, and that the task required cooperation with banks which
Treasury could best provide. Further, he felt that Biddle's choice
as Alien Property Custodian, Leo Crowley, would abuse his posi-
tion to reward political hacks with high-paying jobs, instead of
entrusting the vested companies to professional managers.
The Treasury-Justice battle was waged from January to
March, 1942, with the GAF case as its focal point. Treasury
agents had investigated GAF after the Pearl Harbor attack and had
concluded that it was cloaking subversive activities. Morgenthau
believed that a strenuous purge of GAF by the Treasury might
enable it to defeat Justice's arguments, and thus permit Treasury to
control other large alien businesses for the war's duration. In the
words of Morgenthau's biographer:
-His "back to the wall," Morgenthau, as he told his staff,
"decided to fight [any compromise or full transfer of control
to Justice]." He did so in a series of reports to the White
House about various successful ventures of Foreign Funds
Control. The most critical of those reports described the
Treasury's investigation of the General Aniline & Film Corpo-
ration. For weeks to come, the struggle for control over alien
properties focused on the problems of that company. ...
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Morgenthau [told his staff that] . . . if the Treasury suc-
ceeded in handling General Aniline, the Department might
then retain control over other large alien businesses .... 36
Morgenthau was granted authority to proceed with his plans
to purge the GAF management, but Roosevelt soon thereafter
transferred control of alien property to the Justice Department.
B. Litigation, 1945-1959
After the war, the Swiss holding company, I.G. Chemie,
attempted to further cleanse itself of any German taint by changing
its name into French. It became Societe Internationale pour Par-
ticipations Industrielles et Commerciales S.A., or Societe Interna-
tionale. The German equivalent of this new name was Interna-
tional Industrie und Handelsbeteiligungen A.G., or Interhandel.
The names I.G. Chemie, Societe Internationale, and Interhandel all
describe the same organization. The author will refer to it by the
latter name for the remainder of this article.
Interhandel sought to recover its seized assets from the United
States government, claiming that it was neither an enemy nor the
ally of an enemy, but merely a corporation organized in a neutral
country. After first exhausting its administrative remedies without
success, Interhandel brought its case in the courts.
1. United States courts. Interhandel sued the Attorney
General in October, 1948, under section 9(a) of the Trading with
the Enemy Act.37 The case was heard in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia.
The Attorney General relied on an affirmative defense to
defeat Interhandel's claims. He contended that Interhandel was
part of a conspiracy with the private bank of Sturzenegger and
Cie., formerly Greutert and Cie., to disguise Farben's worldwide
holdings, and he asserted that discovery of the true identity of
Interhandel's shareholders would prove Farben control.
The Attorney General requested pre-trial discovery of
relevant documents in the "possession, custody, or control" of
Interhandel, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b).
36. 3 J. BLUM, FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIAuIES: YEAS oF W~AR, 1941-
1945, at 5-8 (1967).
37. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C., App. § 9(a) (1946),
amending Act of Oct. 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 411 (1917).
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Interhandel responded that the documents of its alleged subsidiary,
the private bank of Sturzenegger and Cie., were not in its posses-
sion, custody, or control, and thus that discovery was impossible.
The Attorney General then argued that he would be hampered or
prevented from establishing his conspiracy defense if a member of
the alleged conspiracy were permitted to deny the court access to
its records.
In July, 1949, the district court ordered Interhandel to
produce the designated documents of the Sturzenegger bank for
inspection and copying in Switzerland. 8 Two weeks before the
discovery was to be made in June, 1950, the Swiss Federal Attor-
ney ruled that submission of these documents to the planned
discovery would violate Swiss laws on economic espionage and
banking secrecy, 39 and he took "constructive possession" of the
documents, prohibiting the Sturzenegger bank from allowing the
Americans to examine them. His decision was affirmed by a vote
of the Swiss Nationarat. Although numerous I.G. Chemie docu-
ments were examined by United States officials in Switzerland, the
Sturzenegger papers were not produced.
In October, 1950, the Attorney General moved for dismissal
of Interhandel's complaint under Federal Rule 37(b)(2)(iii),
alleging that the plaintiff had "refused" to permit discovery. The
district court submitted the case to a special master to determine
whether Interhandel lacked good faith in its failure to comply with
the original discovery order.
4 0
The special master's final report was submitted to the court in
July, 1952. He found that Interhandel had sustained its burden of
proof in demonstrating good faith efforts to obtain production of
the Sturzenegger documents; that there was no evidence of collu-
sion between the plaintiff and the Swiss government; that there was
substantial legal basis for the seizure under Swiss law; and that
obtaining consent waivers from those bank customers whose
records were involved was not a practical alternative solution. The
Attorney General filed exceptions to the master's report and argued
38. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Clark, 9 F.R.D. 263 (D.D.C. 1949).
39. The Banking Law is discussed in the text associated with footnotes 2-
7, supra. The Economic Espionage Act, Swiss Penal Code, article 273 (1942)
(Schweizerisches Strasgesetzbuch (STGB), Code penal Suisse (C.PPN.)), makes
it a crime to reveal a "business secret" to a "foreign official" or his agent.
40. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. McGrath, 90 F. Supp. 1011 (D.D.C. 1950).,
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that Interhandel's suit should still be dismissed, regardless of its
good faith efforts.
In February, 1953, the district court held that Interhandel's
suit would be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with
the court's July, 1949, discovery order, unless the Sturzenegger
documents were produced within three months.41 The court did
not dispute the special master's finding that Interhandel had acted
in good faith, but it stressed that an opposite holding would have
placed a foreign plaintiff in a more favorable position than an
American citizen suing in the federal courts.
For several months, Interhandel petitioned the Swiss govern-
ment to ease its prohibition to permit disclosure of those documents
which would not violate Swiss law. When it became evident that
full production was impossible, the district court entered its final
41. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953); noted in 2 AM. J. COMP.
L. 536 (1953); 66 HARv. L. REV. 1316 (1953); 62 YALE L.J. 1248 (1953).
Dismissal with prejudice means that the case may be appealed, but not re-
opened.
In the meantime, minority shareholders of Interhandel who were United
States citizens, and who claimed to represent more than one-third of the voting
stock and more than one-half the ownership equity of GAF, had commenced a
parallel action. They claimed the right to intervene in Interhandel's suit under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). Their theory was that the Attorney Gen-
eral could retain only that interest in the seized assets proportional to enemy stock
ownership and that, since the corporation was enemy-controlled, the dominant
shareholders would not adequately protect their interest.
The district court denied their motion to intervene and the court of appeals
affirmed. Kaufmann v. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A., 188 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The Supreme Court re-
versed by a 5-3 vote, holding that the severable rights of non-enemy stockholders
of a neutral corporation to their proportionate interest in seized corporate assets
must be fully protected, even if the corporation is enemy-dominated. Kaufmann
v. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.,
343 U.S. 156 (1952).
The Kaufmann majority was strongly criticized in the dissenting opinion and
by law review commentators. The majority was accused of disregarding the cor-
porate law principle that a shareholder has no present interest in the specific cor-
porate assets, that any pre-liquidation return of assets to shareholders would be
harmful to corporate creditors (which here included the war claims fund), and
that the proper remedy for such shareholders should be limited to individual suits
for money damages against the Attorney General. Noted in 40 CALrF. L. REv.
558 (1952); 52 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1952); 51 MICH. L. REV. 651 (1953); 27
ST. JOHN'S L REV. 139 (1952); 22 U. CN. L REV. 276 (1953); 62 YALE L.J.
1210 (1953).
The McGrannery court held that the dismissal order would not apply to the
claims of the Kaufmann intervenors, since they never had possession, custody, or
control of the Sturzenegger documents.
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dismissal in November, 1953. 4" The court of appeals affirmed,
but allowed six more months of grace.43  The Swiss government
proposed a compromise whereby a neutral expert investigator
would examine the Sturzenegger records with the consent of all the
parties to the case. The district court rejected the proposal, and
denied Interhandel's motion to vacate the dismissal. The court of
appeals re-affirmed. 4
Interhandel had been in default of the production order for
seven years before the district court's dismissal became final. The
original discovery order called for the examination of some 700
jackets, 140 account books, and 2,500 original documents.45 In
seven years, over 190,000 documents had been offered by Inter-
handel, but none of the crucial Sturzenegger papers were included.
The State Department conceded to the Swiss government that
Interhandel had exhausted its domestic remedies.
However, in June, 1958, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts by unanimous vote. It held that, despite
the effect of Swiss law, the Sturzenegger papers were within Inter-
handel's "control" under the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 34. However, it found the Rule 37 dismissal of Inter-
handel's suit to be an unconstitutional denial of due process,
because Interhandel's non-compliance had been due to its inability
to produce the documents, and not due to wilfulness or bad faith.
The case was remanded with instructions to require additional
evidence of good faith, explore plans for fuller compliance, or
proceed to trial on the merits. 48
2. International litigation. After the district court's dismis-
sal became final, but before the Supreme Court had agreed to review
the case, the Swiss government interceded on Interhandel's behalf
with diplomatic efforts. On August 9, 1956, the Swiss govern-
42. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Brownell, 15 F.R.D. 83 (D.D.C. 1953).
43. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937
(1956).
44. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Brownell, 243 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 355 U.S. 812 (1957),
rev'd, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
45. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Clark, 9 F.R.D. 263, 266 (D.D.C. 1949).
46. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); noted in 46 CALIF. L. REv. 836 (1958);
107 U. PA. L. REv. 103 (1958).
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ment delivered a note to the State Department, charging the United
States with violation of the Washington Accord of May 25, 1946,
because of its failure to release Swiss assets within the United
States. The note requested the United States to submit the Inter-
handel controversy to arbitration or conciliation, in conformity
with the provisions of the United States-Swiss Treaty of Arbitration
and Conciliation of February 16, 193 1.7
The United States rejected the Swiss request in a note and
memorandum dated January 11, 1957.48 The State Department
relied on its unilateral interpretation of the 1931 and 1946 treaties,
and asserted that the subject matter of the difference was within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States. It would seem that
conflicting interpretations placed on the two treaties by the two
governments would have made the matter a question of "treaty
interpretation" and thus beyond the exclusive domestic jurisdiction
of one of the parties. However, the United States argued that,
insofar as the 1931 and 1946 treaties dealt with the issue at all,
they confirmed the domestic jurisdiction of the United States in the
Interhandel controversy, and thus gave rise to no obligation to
submit the matter to arbitration.
Thus rebuffed diplomatically, Switzerland sued the United
States in the International Court of Justice at The Hague, in
October, 1957. Switzerland claimed the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court,4" and prayed for restoration to Interhandel of GAF's
assets or, in the alternative, submission of the dispute to arbitra-
tion.
The United States responded with several preliminary objec-
tions to the jurisdiction of the International Court. The most
important of these stated that Interhandel had not exhausted local
remedies available to it in the United States courts and that Ameri-
can acceptance of the International Court's jurisdiction was subject
47. Arbitration and Conciliation Treaty with Switzerland, Feb. 16, 1931, 47
Stat. 1983 (1931), T.S. No. 844 (effective May 23, 1932).
48. 36 DEP'T STATE BULL. 350 (1957).
49. Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice pro-
vides in part:
The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare
that they recognize as compulsory . . . the jurisdiction of the Court in
all legal disputes concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any
question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if es-
tablished, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d)
the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
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to an automatic reservation (the Connally Amendment)5 ° which
excluded matters within the United States' domestic jurisdiction.
In March, 1959, the International Court rendered judgment
on the preliminary objections. By a nine-judge majority, it held
the Swiss application inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic
remedies. 51  The Court found it unnecessary to adjudicate the
validity of the Connally Amendment.
C. Settlement, 1961-1965
After eleven years in the courts, the Interhandel case was no
closer to resolution than it had been in 1948. The Interhandel
shareholders and the Swiss government were apparently prepared
to litigate indefinitely for the return of their assets, but two factors
compelled the United States to seek a settlement.
The first was the business performance of GAF. The firm's
daily operations were run with only minimal intrusion from the
Justice Department, but pressure was mounting to get the Attorney
General out of the dye and chemical business. GAF's 1963 sales
of $179 million ranked it as the 273d largest industrial corporation
in the United States. Impressive as that seems at first glance, a
closer look at the then rapidly-expanding chemical industry shows
that GAF was operating well below its full potential.52 In large
50. Declaration of the United States of America of August 14, 1946, 61 Stat.
1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598. The Declaration reads in part:
mhis declaration shall not apply to . . . (b) Disputes with regard to
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States of America as determined by the United States of America.
The United States' reliance on the Connally Amendment in the Interhandel
case is strengthened by the fact that it has always claimed the right to invoke
unilaterally such a domestic jurisdiction reservation and by the fact that the Swiss
government itself recognized this claim in its ratification message on the Treaty
of Feb. 16, 1931. See Jacoby, Towards the Rule of Law?, 52 AM. J. INT'L L.
107, 111 (1958).
The United States has been criticized for setting up its own laws as an excuse
for failure to fulfill its international obligations. See Recent Decision, Federal
and International Proceedings-United States Acceptance of International Court
of Justice Compulsory Jurisdiction, 58 MICH. L. REV. 467 (1960); Briggs, Towards
the Rule of Law? United States Refusal to Submit to Arbitration of Conciliation
the Interhandel Case, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 517 (1957).
51. Interhandel Case (Preliminary), [1959] I.C.J. 6.
52. While GAF's sales rose 155% and its net income rose 6% from 1946
to 1962, the comparable figures for Dow Chemical, a competitor, were 703% and
409%. NEWSWEFK, Sept. 24, 1962, at 70. In 1962, a leading GAF product
earned 3% return on sales, while Eastman Kodak, a competitor, earned 13.3%.
NEWSWEek, Mar. 18, 1963, at 79.
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part, this was the result of management practices designed to
conserve assets for eventual sale or liquidation, thus forfeiting
growth opportunities.
The second factor was GAF's role as an embarrassing politi-
cal issue. A succession of Attorneys General had packed the GAF
Board of Directors with patronage appointees.
The government [had] installed seven different chief exec-
tives during its regime and scores of directors, with a heavy
preponderance of professional politicians and politically-ori-
ented businessmen ... [It seemed . . . clear that the
Attorney General was bestowing directorships on the party
faithful much as the Queen doles out Birthday Honors.58
During the Kennedy Administration, even selection of GAF's ac-
counting firm and advertising agency was influenced by crony-
ism.5"
In addition, the court case was costing the United States
millions, with no prospect for clear-cut victory. 5  In October
1962, the Congress approved amendments to the War Claims Act
of 1948, and the Trading with the Enemy Act permitting the Attor-
ney General to sell GAF stock to the highest bidder among Ameri-
can investment banking and underwriting firms, with the success-
ful bidder then required to offer the stock at public sale, and the
53. Ross, General Aniline Goes Private, FORTUNE, Sept. 1963, at 127, 129.
54. Id. at 144. Ross further states:
For twenty years, until it was dismissed in 1961, Arthur Anderson &
Co. had checked the [GAP] books. . . . [Now] one of the nation's
leading accountants was replaced by an obscure New York firm, Wright,
Long & Co.
It did not escape Republican notice that Wright Long's chief quali-
fication appeared to be Carmine Bellino's association with it. Bellino
. . . had been largely responsible for developing [the Senate Rackets
Committee] case against Teamster leader Dave Beck and, in the process,
helping to elevate Robert Kennedy to national prominence ...
In November, 1960, Reach, McClinton & Co. won the [GAF adver-
tising] account in a competition against nine other firms. The following
April, after the Kennedy Administration took over, it cancelled Reach,
McClinton's contract. The company then hired Lennen & Newell, one
of the competitors the preceeding autumn. One of Lennen & Newell's
vice-presidents, K. LeMoyne Billings, is a close friend of President Ken-
nedy's. Having been attacked for this rather personal choice, the Attor-
ney General now argues that Billings' devotion to the Kennedy Adminis-
tration has persuaded him that Lennen & Newell would put forth espe-
cially strenuous efforts on behalf of General Aniline.
Id.
55. In a March, 1963 press conference, President Kennedy remarked that In-
terhandel was the type of case only lawyers could enjoy. One of those lawyers
might have been John J. Wilson, who had represented Interhandel in the United
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proceeds to be held in escrow until final resolution of the Interhan-
del suit.56 Interhandel advised that any attempt to sell the stock
would prompt it to test the constitutionality of the new legislation.
Over great opposition within the Treasury and Justice Depart-
ments, Attorney General Robert Kennedy offered to settle. The
Interhandel shareholders voted to accept the offer in March, 1963,
and the proposal was approved by the district court.5 7 A formula
was devised to re-capitalize the GAF stock, and bidding proce-
dures were devised.
In March, 1965, a 225-member underwriting syndicate sub-
mitted the winning bid of $329.1 million, or $29.47 per share. The
stock was subsequently offered for resale to the public at $30.60
per share. The sale price was divided among the parties: $1.5
million for expenses, $17.5 million to the United States for back
taxes, $120.9 million to the Interhandel shareholders, and $189.2
million to the United States for its war claims fund.58
IV. UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO PENETRATE
BANK SECRECY SINCE 1965
The most striking difference between the American attempts
to probe bank secrecy during the World War II era and the efforts
of the past decade is the reversed roles of the Swiss and United
States governments. In 1945, the United States held all the bar-
gaining power: it had frozen Swiss funds, blacklisted Swiss firms,
refused to trade goods necessary to Swiss survival and vested GAF
assets. Until Switzerland disclosed the bank secrets concerning the
Safehaven Program and Interhandel, the United States could afford
to sit passively.
With the realization that American citizens had been able to
violate, evade or avoid American laws through the device of Swiss
bank accounts, the United States found itself in the role of suppli-
cant. This problem is widespread. One estimate indicates that
20,000 to 30,000 Americans have Swiss bank accounts with an
aggregate value of between $100 and $200 million.59 As Ameri-
56. See Pub. L. No. 87-846, 76 Stat. 1107, amending 50 U.S.C., App. § 9(a)
(1946).
57. Unreported opinion. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1964, § III, at 1, col. 6.
58. The Interhandel share was further divided among the Kaufmann inter-
venors and parties known only to their Swiss bankers. See note 41, supra.
59. Comment, Swiss Banks and Their American Clients: A Fading Ro-
mance, 3 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 37 n.2 (1972).
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can officials realized that they desperately needed assistance from
the Swiss, demands gave way to requests, and confrontation turned
into cooperation.
It is curious that American interest in Swiss bank secrecy
should peak during the late 1960s. Part of the reason lies in the
prosperity which that decade brought. A growing American up-
per middle class, increasing financial sophistication, a prolonged
bull market in securities, and relatively low-cost jet travel between
North America and Europe all contributed to an increase in white
collar crime which, by 1968, was simply too onerous to ignore.
Another reason is more subtle, however. That reason is politics.
When the Democrats lost the 1968 presidential election to the
Republicans, they wanted to leave their successors a thorny issue
which would prove too embarrassing for the Republicans to
ignore. The bank secrecy question was most opportune, since
the Republicans had campaigned, in part, on the crime issue. In
1968, during the waning hours of the Johnson Administration, the
pressure to act on the bank secrecy question came from the Justice
Department. The chief protagonists were Robert M. Morgenthau,
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Fred M.
Vinson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, in charge of the Criminal
Division. Both men are the sons of the individuals most responsi-
ble for the hard-line American policy against Swiss bank secrecy
during the 1940s, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, and his
successor, Fred M. Vinson, Sr. In most respects, the sons outper-
formed their fathers.
A. The Discovery of the Bank Secrecy Crime Problem
Various American criminal prosecutions have established that
bank secrecy laws have furnished protection for a variety of illegal
activities. The most important of these are tho avoidance of
American securities laws, evasion of American taxes and financing
of other crimes.
1. Avoidance of securities laws. Swiss banks provide a wide
range of investment and brokerage services for their customers. To
deal in American securities, they maintain "omnibus accounts" at
American brokerage houses, and trade for their customers in the
bank's name. Inspection of the broker's records by American
officials will indicate only trades under the bank's account. Thus,
bank secrecy conceals the identity of the real party in interest.
During the bull market of the 1960s, this system was abused by
27
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American investors to violate margin requirements, manipulate
market prices, and retain short-swing insider trading profits.
The Federal Reserve Board exempts such omnibus accounts
from the general margin requirements of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.00 The exception permits brokers and dealers, includ-
ing foreign banks, to extend large amounts of credit to each other,
and its misuse permits American investors to trade or purchase
securities on insufficiently collateralized credit. Bank secrecy
shields corporate insiders from the various disclosure requirements
of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, such as the short-swing
insider trading report required by section 16(a), and the report of
takeover bids and 'tender offers involving the acquisition of more
than five percent of a corporation's stock required by section
13(d).
A 1968 government estimate stated that about eight percent
of all New York Stock Exchange transactions had been conducted
by foreign banks."1 Another was more specific:
Swiss purchases of U.S. securities, virtually all of which were
originated by Swiss banks acting for clients, amounted to
$232 million in 1967, about 32% of all the American mar-
kets' foreign intake. [In 1968], the figure climbed to $811
million, 37% of the total. 62
A few examples will illustrate the dangers.
The American promoters of Gulf Coast Leaseholds, Inc. ac-
quired a large quantity of worthless, unregistered over-the-counter
stock in 1954. They then sold this stock to Liechtenstein-based
trusts, which they controlled, and created a market in Gulf Coast
shares. When the price rose to $16 a share, the promoters took
their profits and deposited them in the Swiss bank accounts of the
Liechtenstein trusts, while the stock value declined to less than one
dollar per share. By this market manipulation, one of the promot-
ers realized a profit of $4 million on an original investment of
under $21.63
The Arzi Bank of Zurich, Switzerland, and the New York
60. Margin requirements are established under section 7 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 886, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970). See 12
C.F.R. § 207.5 (1970).
61. TIME, Dec. 20, 1968, at 75.
62. Bus. WEEK, Nov. 8, 1969, at 120.
63. See United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 947 (1966).
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City brokerage firm of Coggeshall and Hicks pleaded guilty64 in
1968 and 1969, respectively, to margin violations. The employees
and customers of Coggeshall and Hicks had traded $20 million in
securities during the period of 1964 to 1968 through accounts at
the Arzi Bank and Arzi's omnibus account, at only 10-20%
margin. The scheme yielded over $225,000 in commissions to the
brokerage firm, in addition to the profits on the trades.6 5
In a bull market, when "hot issues" of new securities often sell
at market prices above their offering prices, the underwriter some-
times does not distribute them to the general public, but instead
reserves them for favored customers. A 1969 indictment charged
the President of First Hanover Corp., a New York underwriter,
with issuing a misleading prospectus on three such new issues. He
had failed to disclose that significant amounts of these new issues
were purchased by a dummy Panamanian corporation, of which
the accused was a 48% owner, via Swiss bank accounts. By this
device, he realized a 300% increase over the purchase price of the
stock.6"
A 1970 indictment charged a conspiracy between the Weiss-
credit Bank of Chiasso, Switzerland, the First Vice President
of Shearson, Hammill and Co., a New York City brokerage firm.
The conspiracy had permitted the American customers of Shear-
son, Hammill to purchase securities through Weisscredit's omnibus
account by posting as little as 20% margin. The Federal Reserve
Board required payment of 70-80% cash on such purchases at the
time, and thus over $3 million of illegal credit was extended.
67
2. Income tax evasion. A variety of income tax evasion
schemes has been employed by Americans with Swiss accounts.
The simplest device is "skimming". Unreported cash receipts
are deposited in Swiss bank accounts by individuals such as self-
64. The guilty plea of the Arzi Bank is noteworthy for several reasons. By
voluntarily placing itself under an American court's jurisdiction, it became the
first Swiss bank to admit to criminal acts. Why? By pleading guilty and paying
a $2,500 fine, Arzi negotiated the return of over $1 million in securities held for
it by various brokerage houses in New York, which were seized by the government
as "fruits of the crime." N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1968, at 59, col. 7; id., Dec. 20,
1968, at 71, col. 7. The Swiss Bankers Association stated that its members ob-
serve American margin requirements, and noted that Arzi was not an Association
member. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1968, at 78, col. 2.
65. See authorities cited in footnote 64, supra.
66. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1969, at 45, col. 1.
67. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1970, at 61, col. 4.
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employed professionals, retailers, or gambling casino operators
whose cash receipts are free from withholding tax. Businesses
with income from foreign sources have used double invoice systems
to divert part of their receipts into Swiss accounts. Others have
"loaned" money to a foreign corporation and then claimed a bad
debt deduction when the latter defaulted on the "loan". • In reality,
the lender owned the borrowing company and his "loan" was
simply a payment into his own Swiss account. Some firms have
established business trusts abroad to receive the commissions for
services they have performed, and then channeled receipts from the
trusts into Swiss accounts.
Once cash receipts are deposited in a Swiss account, other
possibilities arise. Income from interest, dividends from securities,
and trading profits from such an account are not reported to the
Internal Revenue Service. Some taxpayers have even claimed an
interest deduction on foreign-source "loans" which are actually
withdrawals from their own accounts. These and other possibili-
ties for abuse seem endless.
3. Other criminal activities. Various responsible spokesmen
for the United States government have observed that Swiss bank
secrecy furnishes protection for white collar crimes by thwarting the
efforts of investigators and prosecutors. The most complete airing
of these charges occurred at the December, 1969 hearings on H.R.
15073 before the Committee on Banking and Currency of the U.S.
House of Representatives.68
Various witnesses at these 1969 hearings alleged that black
market currency dealings, 69 bribes and kickbacks to government
and military officials,7" laundering of stolen money and securi-
ties, 71 and financing of illegal narcotics traffic72 have all been
hidden from American investigators by Swiss bank secrecy. More
recently, the Defense Department charged that Swiss accounts have
68. Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
69. Statement by Lane Dwinell, Agency for International Development, id.
at 122-28.
70. Statement by Frank A. Bartimo, Assistant General Counsel, Manpower
& Reserve Affairs, Department of Defense, id., at 128-35.
71. Statement by Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, Department of Justice, Hearings on the Legal and Economic Impact of
Foreign Banking Procedures on the United States Before the House Committee
on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7-10 (1968).
72. Statement by Robert M. Morgenthau, U.S. Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, id., at 45.
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concealed payments to American military personnel who had sup-
plied intelligence information to foreign governments.
7 3
One of the largest of such criminal cases was concluded in
October, 1969, when Francis Rosenbaum and Andrew Stone
pleaded guilty to defrauding the United States Navy of $4.6 million
on a defense contract. The two were officers of Chromcraft
Corporation of St. Louis which was the successful bidder on a $50
million contract with the Navy to manufacture a rocket launcher.
Chromcraft sub-contracted parts of the work to dummy Swiss
corporations which ostensibly were performing work overseas.
These Swiss corporations established by the defendants submitted
fraudulent bills for materials to Chromcraft, which, in turn,
charged the Navy. Payments by the Navy eventually filtered into
the defendants' Swiss bank accounts. 4
4. Scope of the problem. These allegations by United States
officials concerning the abuses of bank secrecy are serious. Two
striking features of the problem have not been widely discussed, yet
are vital to a balanced perspective.
First, the bank secrecy abuses are generally confined to the
fringes of the Swiss banking system. Most of the flow of Ameri-
can dollars to Swiss banks is openly deposited and withdrawn for
legitimate ends. 75 Since 1952, member banks of the Swiss Bank-
ers Association have observed the Federal Reserve Board's margin
requirements when buying American securities for American cus-
tomers. Since 1957, no Swiss bank has knowingly permitted itself
to become involved in an American corporate proxy battle.76 Most
banks insist that they accept deposits only from persons whose true
identity and business backgrounds are known, and must satisfy
themselves that the money they take is not stolen.
The Swiss Bankers Association has repeatedly observed that
most of the bad publicity about "Swiss banks" is generated by
foreign-owned banks and the handful of small Swiss-owned banks
which are not Association members.
There are tiny banks, many of them owned by non-Swiss,
that probably will take money with no questions asked ...
73. Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 1969, at A-8, col. 1.
74. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1969, at 62, col. 1; id., Dec. 4, 1969, at 40, col.
5; Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1970, at A-8, col. 1.
75. U.S. NEws & WORLD REP'T, Dec. 23, 1968, at 73.
76. Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 128, 135
(1966).
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But the. . . Big Five commercial banks, the cantonal banks
• . . [and] -the private banks-are a different breed alto-
gether. They are decidedly . . .. so big and so successful
that they do not have to shave corners. 77
More than fifty such small institutions have sprung up since 1950.
This proliferation results from the permissive attitude of the Swiss
towards the establishment of new banks. Unlike the United States,
there is no requirement in Switzerland that a need for a new bank
be shown.
78
Given the importance of the banking industry to the Swiss
economy, it is not surprising that criticism from abroad has stung
the Swiss. In cases where crimes are prosecutable under both
Swiss and United States law, the Swiss bankers and government
have moved decisively to assist American investigators. The most
publicized example of this cooperation was the 1972 case against
Clifford and Edith Irving over the "Howard Hughes hoax.
'79
The second, and more neglected, aspect of the bank secrecy
issue is the manner in which an American "national problem" has
been extrapolated from a purely New York City phenomenon.
Publicity about bank secrecy abuse has originated largely
from New York. Apart from an occasional congressional story in
the Washington newspapers, coverage has been restricted to the
New York Times and Wall Street Journal. Legal periodical litera-
ture reflects a New York bias as well, with the bulk of commentary
since 1965 supplied by publications from such law schools as
Albany, Brooklyn, Columbia, Fordham, New York University,
Syracuse and Yale. 0 Some of this is attributable to New York's
77. Bus. WEEK, Apr. 17, 1971, at 80.
78. Comment, Secret Foreign Bank Accounts, 6 TEXAs INT'L L.F. 105, 124
(1970).
79. Bus. WEEK, Feb. 5, 1972, at 25-27. Edith Irving opened a Swiss ac-
count in the name of H.R. Hughes, into which three checks worth $650,000 were
deposited for Clifford Irving's alleged work on the AuTroIoGRAPHY OF HOwARD
HUGHES. Edith withdrew the money in cash almost as soon as the checks had
cleared, then deposited over $440,000 in a second bank across the street, under
the name of Hanna Rosenkranz, and finally, invested a portion of the money in
American securities. When the victim, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., filed a
memorandum of possible fraud with the Zurich District Attorney, the banks re-
leased their evidence to the Swiss investigating officials, who ultimately im-
pounded the cash and securities. Evasion of American taxes is not a Swiss crim-
inal offense (see text associated with footnote 117, infra), but Edith Irving was
charged with fraud and the illegal use of an altered passport, both of which are
Swiss crimes.
80. See note 76 supra, and notes 108-09, 112, 123 & 124 infra.
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role as a leading financial, business, and banking center, but more
of it stems from New York politicians who have long found it
advantageous at election time to be "against" Swiss banks.
In 1957, State Attorney General Louis Lefkowitz accused
three trusts administered through Swiss banks, of defrauding the
American public of $6 million, but complained bitterly that he was
powerless to halt the fraud.8 New York's large Jewish population
has been particularly sensitive to questions concerning Nazi Ger-
many. Thus, it was front page news in 1964 when U.S. Senator
Kenneth Keating accused his election challenger, Robert Kennedy,
of turning over $60 million to a "huge Nazi cartel" by settling the
Interhandel case. Kennedy called the charge a smear and ob-
served that Keating had introduced legislation to facilitate the
sale.82 In the 1970 state attorney general election, Lefkowitz's
challenger alleged that his failure to curb Swiss bank account
transactions had cost the state $250 million in lost revenues.8"
But by far the major source of pressure for criminal prosecutions,
publicity, and legislative reform has been Robert Morgenthau, a
twice-unsuccessful candidate for the New York governorship, who
was U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York between
1961 and 1969. In his own words:
[A]n intensive investigation [on the illegal use of secret ac-
counts] was conducted by my office when I was United States
Attorney. . . . During the course of that investigation...
more than 75 persons were indicted, and dozens of cases were
referred to the Internal Revenue Service for criminal investi-
gation. For each case we prosecuted, however, there were
roughly six cases where we had specific information that a
crime had been committed, but we were unable to prosecute
either because we lacked the resources to complete the in-
vestigation, or because the evidence we had was inadmissible
in court.
8 4
Bank secrecy prosecutions have been brought subsequently in
other jurisdictions, but most have been isolated cases which fell
into a prosecutor's lap when a disenchanted co-conspirator con-
81. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1957, at 1, col. 4.
82. N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1964, at 1, col. 3; id., Sept. 22, 1964, at 1, col.
5; id., Sept. 23, 1964, at 35, col. 1.
83. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1970, at 74, col. 3.
84. Address by Robert M. Morgenthau to the American Management Asso-
ciation, May 27, 1970, 36 VrrAL SPEEcBEs 553, 554 (1970).
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fessed. Morgenthau's investigations are, to date, the most system-
atic and complete.
Mr. Morgenthau's uncommon tenacity in prosecuting bank
secrecy crimes is interesting in view of his father's earlier involve-
ment with the issue at the Treasury Department in the 1940s. Yet
these two men share more than blood; they share the New Deal
Democrat's suspicion and hostility for businessmen, and most espe-
cially, for "business crimes" such as tax crimes. The father's views
are recorded by his biographer:
Morgenthau . . . considered the [high income tax] rates of
the 1930s eminently just, and the toleration of tax avoidance,
a crime against society. . . . In this spirit, Morgenthau
spurred the prosecution of criminal charges of tax evasion
• . . against [his predecessor as Secretary of the Treasury,
Andrew] Mellon in March 1934 . . . . Morgenthau said "I
consider that Mr. Mellon is not on trial but Democracy and
the privileged rich and I want to see who will win." In court,
Mellon won. . . . Things the courts approved outraged the
Secretary's personal sense of justice.
8 5
Morgenthau was determined to use federal authority to insure
honest business behavior. . . . He was solicitous of small
business, suspicious of big business, and especially wary of
the motives of the giant institutions of American finance.86
The son's views differ in style, but not in content:
It would be unfortunate . . . if the . . . war on crime were
to be viewed as solely a war on the crimes of the poor and
underprivileged. . . . [I]t is a deplorable fact that in the
past we have tended to treat more sympathetically the busi-
nessman guilty of tax fraud or the broker guilty of stock fraud
than the poor man guilty of auto theft or hijacking a truck.
• . . [T]he vitality of our country rests in substantial part
upon the willingness of free men freely to contribute their
proportionate share to the national revenue.8 7
In large measure, the American posture towards Swiss bank
secrecy is an outgrowth of these attitudes concerning white collar
crimes. It is important to recognize that the success of American
85. 1 J. BLUM, FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES: YEARS OF CRISIS, 1928-
1938, at 324-25 (1959).
86. 2 J. BLUM, FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARrES: YEARS OF URGENCY, 1938-
1941, at 4 (1965).
87. Address by Robert M. Morgenthau, supra note 84, at 557.
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foreign policy efforts has been inversely proportional to the "righ-
teousness" displayed by American representatives abroad. The
statements above by Secretary Morgenthau offer no hope of com-
promise, and as a result, American-Swiss relations were poor at the
end of World War II. The milder rhetoric of the younger Morgen-
thau has led to much better results.
B. Unilateral Action: The 1970 Bank Secrecy Act
By 1968, the role of bank secrecy in thwarting American law
enforcement had become obvious. Preliminary bilateral discus-
sions between the United States and Switzerland had started, but
did not seem promising, and therefore, domestic action was com-
menced.
1. Legislative history. The House of Representatives Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency convened to study the problem
and to explore unilateral domestic solutions. Two days of investi-
gative hearings were held in December, 1968. Committee Chairman
Wright Patman"8 initially hoped for legislation which would pro-
hibit the use of accounts in bank secrecy jurisdictions by Ameri-
cans unless complete disclosure was first made. Witnesses from
the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion convinced him of the impracticality of that approach, and of
the need for domestic banks to keep more extensive records of
customer transactions to combat the problem. However, further
action was postponed.
Substantial action was commenced in the next Congress
when, on December 3, 1969, Chairman Patman introduced bank
secrecy legislation drafted by his Committee staff in cooperation
with Treasury and Justice Department officials. His Committee
conducted extensive and well-publicized hearings on the proposed
legislation (H.R. 15073), taking six days of testimony in Decem-
ber, 1969, and February and March, 1970. On March 28, 1970,
the Committee reported the Patman bill to the full House with
approval recommended unanimously. After a brief and unevent-
88. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss at any length Rep. Wright
Patman's enormous influence in shaping the banking laws. It is worthy of note
that he has been a lifetime foe of banking power concentration. Patman, until
his recent death at age eighty-two, was the most senior member of the House of
Representatives, having served continuously for forty-seven years since 1929. He
chaired the Banking and Currency Committee from 1963 to 1974.
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ful floor debate, the bill gained House approval on May 25, 1970,
by yet another unanimous vote. 9
Senator William Proxmire introduced similar legislation of his
own (S. 3678) on April 6, 1970. Proxmire's bill transcended
Patman's in only two respects: first, trading in American securities
by foreign banks would be halted unless such banks disclosed the
identity of the account holder for whose benefit they were trading,
or certified that they were not trading for American citizens; and
second, Americans with foreign bank accounts were required to
grant their foreign bankers the necessary waiver to permit disclo-
sure of their identity.
Proxmire's bill was referred to the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, and four days of hearings were conducted
in June, 1970, before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions.
Those hearings were perfunctory,90 as supporters of the bill simply
read prepared statements into the record and responded to occa-
sional questions from Senators Proxmire and Wallace Bennett.
Opponents, who objected to the burdensome recordkeeping and
reporting features of the bill, rather than its purpose, waived the
opportunity to testify, and submitted their prepared statements for
inclusion in the record. The Subcommittee recommended the bill
to the full Committee on July 29, 1970. On August 4, 1970, the
Committee reported the bill to the Senate, recommending approval,
and the full Senate approved the Proxmire bill on September 18,
1970, by an unrecorded vote.
A joint House-Senate Conference Committee met October 5,
1970, and adopted the Patman version of the legislation which
President Nixon signed into law on October 26, 1970.
2. Provisions. The 1970 Bank Secrecy Act91 was designed to
make impossible the anonymous movement of large sums of money
between American banks and banks in secrecy jurisdictions, in-
cluding Switzerland. Its basic premise is that if recording and
reporting requirements are imposed on domestic banks, and if
89. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); 116 CoNG. REc.
16949-73 (1970).
90. The Senate's inattention to the Bank Secrecy Act may be partially ex-
cused by the large number of extraordinarily important issues pending in 1970.
Among them were the Carswell nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court, the intro-
duction of American combat troops from Vietnam into Cambodia, and appropria-
tions debates over the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile and Supersonic Transport.
91. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1730d, 1951-59; 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1970).
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American citizens are unable to use domestic banks as conduits to
move money secretly out of the country, then American investiga-
tors and prosecutors will no longer need to seek information pro-
tected by foreign secrecy laws. The statute contains three main
subdivisions. 2
Title I deals with financial recordkeeping. All instruments
and documents passing through domestic financial institutions
must be recorded by such institutions according to regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. The institutions must
maintain records indicating each account holder's identity and that
of persons authorized to act on behalf of the account. They must
microfilm or photocopy all checks received for deposit or collec-
tion, or presented for payment. Domestic transactions, regardless
of amount, are subject to these requirements. The institutions
must retain these records for a prescribed period, not to exceed six
years. The Secretary may gain access by subpeona to such records
as he needs, and may exempt parties from these requirements by
regulation. Compliance with the regulations is enforced by injunc-
tion and civil or criminal penalties.
Title I is the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act. The first of its three chapters requires reports of domestic
currency transactions to be filed with the Secretary by both the
financial institution and the individual involved. The intent is to
call attention to the deposit or withdrawal of large amounts of
currency under unusual circumstances which may betray criminal
activity. The Secretary is to delineate the breadth of reporting
required.
The second chapter requires reports of currency imports and
exports in amounts over $5,000 to be filed with the Secretary by
the financial institutions and the individual. This does not impose
any limit on the exporting of dollars, but it does require disclosure
in order to combat tax evasion and the 'hiding of assets abroad. The
regulations are to be drawn so as not to unreasonably burden
persons legitimately engaging in international currency transac-
tions.
92. Various Senate floor amendments which added titles relating to credit
cards and consumer credit reporting are irrelevant to the present discussion. The
Act's record-keeping requirements merely formalized the established procedure of
most banks, -which had voluntarily retained such records in the past. Domestic
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Under the third chapter the Secretary may require detailed
records and reports from those individuals who transact business or
maintain relationships with a foreign financial agency. Access to
an individual's records may be gained only by subpeona. Compli-
ance is assured by provisions similar to those of Title I.
Title I amends section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Margin requirements in securities transactions are hereby
applied to American borrowers, without regard to the location of
the lender's place of business or where the transaction occurred.
Under the prior law, only lenders were bound to comply with the
margin requirements,93 and borrowers trading on overextended
credit risked no liability. The intent of this provision is to protect
the stability of American securities markets by regulating more
closely the amount of foreign credit that can be extended to
Americans.
3. Opposition to the Act. The lopsided congressional vote in
favor of the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act gives no hint of any disagree-
ment. In fact, however, the Act's opponents operated behind the
scenes, and strongly influenced the regulations subsequently issued
by the Treasury.
In December, 1969, it appeared that the Nixon Administra-
tion and Chairman Patman shared a common view on the nature of
the remedial action needed to combat the bank secrecy problem.
The input of Justice and Treasury officials in drafting H.R. 15073
has been mentioned above. Various Justice Department spokes-
men endorsed H.R. 15073 during the Decmber 4, 1969 testimony
before the Patman Committee. The Administration's position
changed, however, after consultation with the American Bankers
Association and a number of major banks. Subsequent Treasury
Department witnesses informed the Committee that the bill was too
burdensome on the banks, interfered with international commerce,
and that alternatives were necessary.
94
93. In Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp.
1354, 1357-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), foreign banks were held to be exempt from the
margin requirements of section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
virtue of section 30(b) of the same act.
94. M. MTrrz & J. COHEN, AMERICA, INc. 272-77 (1971). One of the first
casualties of this Treasury-Justice conflict was Robert Morgenthau, a Democratic
appointee who had remained in office nearly a year into the Nixon Administra-
tion. The summary manner in which his resignation was secured caused some
observers to suggest that he was dismissed for his aggressiveness on bank secrecy.
Representative Charles A. Vanik urged the House of Representatives to subpoena
all Morgenthau's files on bank secrecy so that they would not "disappear." N.Y.
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The Treasury want[ed] Swiss co-operation in maintaining the
international balance of payments and monetary stability.
The State Department [was] intent on preserving good rela-
tions because the Swiss [had] been helpful in American inteffi-
gence gathering activities, while the banks, and their allies,
the brokerage houses, [had] a financial stake in unhampered
commerce with the Swiss.95
The Treasury proposed an alternative, multi-phased attack on
foreign bank secrecy. American taxpayers would indicate on their
annual returns the existence of any foreign bank or brokerage
accounts.96 The Secretary would require domestic banks to keep
records only of certain specific foreign transactions. A change in
the Internal Revenue Code would call for a rebuttable presumption
that foreign transactions by American taxpayers involved taxable
income, in the absence of contrary proof. Domestic financial
recordkeeping would be discretionary, with the Secretary to deter-
mine its need.
The Justice Department pressured the Treasury to withdraw
its opposition to H.R. 15073. In March, 1970, Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury Eugene Rossides did endorse similar legislation,
but offered amendments to the recordkeeping program which the
Committee rejected.
Banking industry opponents were more successful in formu-
Times, Dec. 19, 1969, at 49, col. 7. Patman suggested that Morgenthau was fired
because Nixon wished to protect the Wall Street banking establishment from crim-
inal prosecutions. Id., Jan. 16, 1970, at 20, col. 5.
In all fairness to the Nixon Administration, this was simply not the case.
Morgenthau had long overstayed his welcome in a Republican Administration, on
the allegation that he was conducting "important ongoing investigations" and the
glib observation that "the customs and principles of 'the old politics' are no longer
relevant." M. MINTZ & J. COHEN, AmERICA, INC. 276 (1971).
At the time of his resignation, seventy-nine of ninety-three U.S. Attorneys
from the Johnson Administration had been replaced by Nixon appointees, and
most of the remainder had offered their resignations and were holding office only
until successors were appointed. Morgenthau's father also experienced difficulty
in relinquishing appointive office in July, 1945. See 3 J. BLUM, FROM THE MOR-
GENTHAU DIARIES: YEARS OF WAR, 1941-1945, at 464-69 (1967).
95. Sheehan, Brokers Decline to Query Clients, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1969,
at 42, col. 4.
96. The Treasury implemented this change immediately. Since 1970, IRS
Form 1040 has asked:
Did you, at any time during the taxable year, have any interest in or
signature or other authority over a bank, securities, or other financial
account in a foreign country (except in a U.S. military banking facility
operated by a U.S. financial institution)?
An affirmative response requires the taxpayer to file IRS Form 4683.
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lating the regulations after the Act was passed. The Treasury
established a task force to determine the type of records that should
be maintained in order to balance law enforcement needs with the
Act's burden on the banks and the public. The task force consult-
ed extensively with representatives of financial institutions, trade
associations and federal agencies affected by the Act. Proposed
regulations were published in the Federal Register in June, 1971."
These regulations were to take effect in August, 1971, but industry
opposition caused the Treasury to postpone the effective date until
November, 1971,8 and then January, 1972.19  Further discus-
sions and delays ensued, and the Secretary did not issue final
regulations until April, 1972.00
The lengthy opportunity to be heard resulted in regulations
which are much more narrowly drawn than the Act. For example,
Title I recordkeeping exempted from the mandatory copying re-
quirement all checks drawn for less than $100.101 This exemption
eliminated 90% of all personal checks from the microfilming
requirement. Banks, securities brokers and dealers, and currency
transporters were exempted from the Title II reporting require-
ments.1"2 Individual customers and routine interbank transfers
were exempted from the domestic reporting requirement.0 3
The banking industry was still dissatisfied with the Act and
regulations, partially because of the unreasonably burdensome
recordkeeping cost they were forced to absorb. Available figures
indicate that the Bank of America spent $392,000 in 1971, includ-
ing start-up costs, to comply with the Title I microfilming require-
ments. The industry-wide cost of compliance was estimated at $6
million a year."0 4 The figures cause one to pause over Chairman
Patman's remark that "microfilming costs should be borne willing-
ly by the banking community as a part of its civic responsibility to
combat crime." 105
97. Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 103.11-103.49, 36 Fed. Reg. 11208-211 (1971).
98. Treasury News Release, 7 CCH 1971 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6712.
99. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1971, at 41, col. 4.
100. 31 C.F.R. Part 103, 37 Fed. Reg. 6912-15 (1972). However, even the
final regulations were soon amended. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.34(b) (3), as amended,
37 Fed. Reg. 23114 (1972), 38 Fed. Reg. 2174 (1973) (effective Jan. 17, 1973).
101. 31 C.F.R. § 103.34(b)(3).
102. 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(c).
103. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22.
104. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 50 n.22, 80 (1974).
105. Additional Views of the Hon. Wright Patman, H.R REP. No. 975, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1970).
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4. Constitutional challenge. A court test of the Act followed
soon after the final regulations were implemented. Various plain-
tiffs, including individual bank customers, a bank, the California
Bankers Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union ap-
plied for a temporary restraining order, prohibiting the Secretary of
the Treasury from enforcing the Act and regulations. The suit
was filed in June, 1972, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California.
The plaintiffs' major contentions were that records mainte-
nance and reporting by the banks under federal compulsion violat-
ed their fourth amendment guarantee against "unreasonable search
and seizure" and that the requirements imposed on the banks by
the Treasury were unreasonably burdensome, thus depriving the
banks of due process of law. Additional constitutional issues, such
as freedom from compulsory self-incrimination and freedom of
association, were also raised.
In September, 1972, a three-judge district court panel unani-
mously upheld the constitutionality of the recordkeeping require-
ment of Title I and the regulations, and of those Title H provisions
and regulations requiring reports on currency import and export
and relationships with foreign financial institutions. However, by
a 2-1 vote, the court found that the domestic reporting requirement
of Title II violated the fourth amendment, and enforcement of Title
II was thus enjoined."°6
Three separate appeals were taken directly to the United
States Supreme Court. In April, 1974, the Court by 6-3 vote
sustained all sections of the Act and regulations against constitu-
tional challenge.'
The Court held that: (1) because there was ample nexus
between the evil to be overcome and the recordkeeping provision
specified, and because the costs imposed on the banks were not
unreasonable, Title I recordkeeping provisions did not deprive the
bank plaintiff of due process; (2) mere records maintenance by
the bank,without any requirement of disclosure to the government
except via legal process did not constitute an illegal search and
seizure; (3) records maintenance did not violate the right against
106. Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
107. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), noted in 8
AKRON L. REV. 181 (1974); 92 BANKING L.J. 347 (1975); 2 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 203 (1975); 20 N.Y.L.F. 416 (1974); 14 WAsmumN L.J. 134 (1975).
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self-incrimination of the depositor plaintiff or the bank; (4) the
Title H reporting requirements were reasonable, were within the
Congress' power to enact, and did not abridge any fourth amend-
ment rights.
Several issues were left unresolved by the Court which might
form the basis for future constitutional tests of the Act. The
individual depositor plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the Title
II reporting provisions. He had merely alleged an intent to engage
in future foreign currency transactions. He had neither engaged in
such transactions in the past, nor alleged that the information
required by the Secretary would tend to incriminate him. The
ACLU contention that the reporting requirements violated its first
amendment associational interests was held to be too speculative
and hypothetical since it had not alleged that it regularly engaged
in large domestic currency transactions, maintained foreign bank
accounts, or exported and imported currency. The Court did not
discuss the constitutionality of the records and reports which the
Act authorizes the Secretary to require of individuals. At least one
commentator has suggested that the Court's holding is limited in
scope to the present regulations and not to the Act's maximum
potential.
10 8
Extensive law review commentary' °9 predating the Court's
decision has suggested that the Act does violate an implicit consti-
tutional right to financial privacy. Some congressional concern as
well has focused on the privacy issue and at times, two different
committees have dealt with the question."10 However, no defini-
tive action has been forthcoming.
108. Note, The Recent Swiss-American Treaty to Render Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Law Enforcement (An Application of the Bank Secrecy Act): Panacea
or Placebo?, 7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 103, 136 (1974).
109. See Note, The Bank Secrecy Act-Conflict Between Government Access,
to Bank Records and the Right of Privacy, 37 ALBANY L. REV. 566 (1973); Re-
cent Decision, Constitutional Law-Bank Secrecy Act-Provisions of the Act
which Require the Reporting of Domestic Financial Transactions Violate the
Fourth Amendments Prohibition Clause Against Unreasonable Search and Sei-
zure, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 162 (1973); Recent Decision, Constitutional Law-
Bank Secrecy Act Requiring Financial Institutions to Report All Domestic Trans-
actions over $10,000 to the Government Held Violative of the Customers Right
to Privacy, 24 SYRACUSE L. REv. 823 (1973); Note, The 1970 Bank Secrecy Act
and the Right of Privacy, 14 W&M L. REv. 929 (1973); Note, Government Ac-
cess to Bank Records, 83 YALE L.J. 1439 (1973).
110. Hearings to Amend the Bank Secrecy Act Before the Subcomm. on Fi-
nancial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
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C. Bilateral Action, 1968-1975
While the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act is partially a result of
slowly-progressing bilateral discussion between the United States
and Swiss governments, the persistence of both governments in
continuing the discussion of bank secrecy has finally yielded two
concrete measures. Unannounced talks began in the last days of
the Johnson Administration, at the request of the United States.
Assistant Attorney General Vinson met in Bern with representa-
tives of the Swiss Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Justice and
Police. He also met separately with a dozen leading Swiss bank-
ers.
111
1. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court reinterprets the 1951
Double Taxation Convention. By longstanding policy, the Swiss
Federal Tax Administration has consistently denied the requests of
the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for information
concerning the Swiss banking activities of American citizens. The
Swiss bankers were forbidden by article 47(b) of the Banking Law
of 1934 from supplying Swiss tax authorities with information on
their customers' holdings, and banking information unavailable to
Swiss authorities was similarly unavailable to foreign tax authori-
ties. As early as May, 1935, the Federal Tax Administration
informed the IRS that "the only persons from whom we could ask
information are the owners of the accounts in question."11
That policy remained unchanged after the United States and
Switzerland signed the Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, on May 24, 1951.111
In relevant part, article 16 of the Double Taxation Convention
states:
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). After the California Bankers Ass'n decision, Sen-
ators Ervin and Mathias proposed privacy amendments to the Act. N.Y. Times,
Apr. 4, 1974, at 71, col. 7. The House of Representatives Task Force on Privacy,
chaired by Barry M. Goldwater, Jr., also reviewed the Act and recommended lim-
iting its application.
111. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1968, at 20, col. 3. The November, 1968 ap-
proach is in marked contrast to that of December, 1944, when a Swiss Bankers
Association delegation came to Washington to discuss foreign funds control. The
Treasury Department officers refused to meet with them, because they were not
government officials. FEHRENBACH, supra note 15, at 81.
112. Note, The "Secret" Swiss Account: End of an Era, 36 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 384, 389 n.41 (1971).
113. Convention with the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, May 24, 1951, [1952] 2 U.S.T. 1751,
T.I.A.S. No. 2316 (effective Sept. 27, 1951).
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(1) The competent authorities of the contracting States
shall exchange such information [being information avail-
able under the respective taxation laws of the contracting
States] as is necessary . . . for the prevention of fraud or
the like in relation to the taxes which are the subject of the
present Convention ....
(3) [I]n no case shall the provisions of this Article be con-
strued so as to impose upon either of the contracting States
the obligation to carry out administrative measures at vari-
ance with the regulations and practices of either contracting
State. . . which would be contrary to its . . . public policy
or to supply particulars which are not procurable under its
own legislation .. 114
The Swiss government's inability to compel disclosure of
banking secrets is based on Swiss tax law and the distinction which
Swiss law draws between criminal and administrative offenses, as
well as on article 47(b). It is Swiss tax law, not the bank secrecy
law, which holds that Swiss tax authorities may receive information
from a bank only with the consent of the taxpayer concerned.115
This legislation reflects the belief that a confidential relationship
should exist between the citizen and the government with regard to
tax matters. Moreover, there is little practical need for tax evi-
dence to be furnished by third parties, in view of the alternative
provisions in the law which prevent any large-scale tax evasion. 1 8
Like most nations, Switzerland will assist other countries in
civil and criminal matters, but not in matters of administrative law.
Military, political, and fiscal prosecutions are considered to be
administrative. Securities and foreign exchange violations and tax
evasion are fiscal offenses, and thus the Swiss have refused legal
assistance to other nations in these areas.1 7  Switzerland takes the
view that the internal legislation of each country should provide
effective measures against tax evasion.
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has recently reconsidered
114. Id., art. 16.
115. Mueller, supra note 2, at 371, 373.
116. Among these preventive measures are a high withholding tax rate (30%
on capital income and bank account interest), an extensive system of cooperation
between the Federal Tax Administration and the cantonal tax authorities, the ac-
cess which tax authorities have to information on the tax returns of other Swiss
taxpayers, and the possible remedy of assessing tax on an implied income basis.
Mueller, supra note 2, at 371.
117. Id. at 375.
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this internal Swiss law and the 1951 Double Taxation Convention.
In October, 1969, the IRS began its first successful assault on the
abuse of bank secrecy to evade American tax laws. It invoked
article 16(1) of the 1951 Double Taxation Convention, which
provides for the exchange of information necessary to prevent
"fraud or the like," and requested that the Federal Tax Adminis-
tration obtain a Swiss court order requiring production of informa-
tion from the records of a Swiss bank on the dealings between the
bank and "X", an American citizen residing in the United States,
who was suspected of defrauding the American tax authorities.
An independent Federal Tax Administration investigation
confirmed the IRS' suspicions, and the Federal Tax Administration
then informed the interested parties that it was going to send the
requested information to the IRS. A Swiss trial court rejected the
objections of X and his Swiss bank, and an appeal was taken by X
to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, which on December 23, 1970,
sustained the Federal Tax Administration."'
X argued unsuccessfully that there was no basis under Swiss
federal or cantonal law for the investigation, that no action for tax
fraud was pending in the United States against him, and that Swiss
banking secrecy forbade transmission of such information. The
Court found it unnecessary for X to be under tax fraud indictment
in the United States as a precondition to supplying information,
stating "[i]t is essential only that there be a suspicion, substantiat-
ed by facts, that fraud or the like has been committed or . . . is
planned."'1 9  It also found that the Federal Tax Administration
had conducted an independent investigation which was adequate
"[to] substantiate to a sufficient degree the suspicion of tax fraud
or the like,"' 2 ° and thus disprove that the case involved "simple tax
evasion," the administrative offense excepted by article 16(3).
118. X v. The Federal Tax Administration, 71-1 U.S. TAx CAs. 86,566 (Swiss
Fed. Sup. Ct. 1970).
119. Id. at 86,569.
120. Id. Under American revenue law, "evasion" and "fraud" are synony-
mous terms which connote conduct which is criminal and which also forms the
basis for the imposition of the civil fraud penalty. American law distinguishes
between tax avoidance and tax evasion. Tax avoidance is legal and involves a
taxpayer's arranging his affairs to minimize the tax legally due. Tax evasion in-
volves the failure to pay the tax legally due and is a crime.
The Swiss ascribe to "evasion" a connotation of "lesser", and to "fraud" a
connotation of "greater" culpability. Tax evasion in Switzerland is only a civil
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The Court then turned to the issue of whether the Federal
Tax Administration could have obtained the information in ques-
tion from the banks if a fraud had been committed under Swiss tax
law. Inquiring as to when a bank must furnish information con-
cerning possible tax fraud committed by a customer with respect to
the assessment of a Swiss income tax, the Court found that canton-
al tax law varies and Swiss federal law is silent. The Court then
considered whet-her the 1951 Double Taxation Convention had
undertaken a federal obligation to furnish banking information in
certain cases, or whether it had simply obliged Switzerland to
exchange that information which could be obtained under the
applicable cantonal law. If such a federal obligation had been
established by article 16, then it would take precedence over any
divergent cantonal law.
Examination of the text and notes of the 1951 Double Taxa-
tion Convention gave the Court no hint as to whether such a
federal obligation had been intended by the parties. Thus, the
Court undertook its own analysis of the question.
If the Swiss commitment under the 1951 Double Taxation
Convention were only to furnish bank information available under
applicable cantonal laws, then American taxpayers, in choosing
their Swiss banks, would make the obvious geographical choices.
The Court was certain that the United States negotiators to the
1951 Double Taxation Convention must have been interested in the
availability of banking information from Zurich, Basel, and Gene-
va, the three major international banking centers in Switzerland. In
these three cantons, tax fraud is a criminal offense, prosecutions
are governed by the respective cantonal codes of criminal proce-
dure, and banks must give full evidence in such- criminal prosecu-
tions. Since the American negotiators might in good faith have
understood the law of these major banking cantons to be the
prevailing Swiss law, and thus have assumed that the Swiss had
agreed to exchange information in tax fraud cases, the Court held
that banking information in tax fraud cases was information
available under the taxation laws of Switzerland, despite any
contrary position expressed in the tax legislation of the less inter-
nationally-important cantons. Finally, the Court found that if
the statute of limitations had expired in either the United States
or Switzerland, the requirement that the act be punishable in
both countries would be lacking, and the information could not be
produced. Unfortunately for X, the statute had not run.
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The decision in X v. Federal Tax Administration1 ' reversed
Swiss policy of nineteen years' standing under the 1951 Double
Taxation Convention. The veil of bank secrecy has been lifted in
Switzerland only by court order, and the effect of this case is to
interpret the Convention so as to create narrow conditions under
which such court orders will issue in the future.
Successful use of this holding by the IRS will require that
several conditions be met. The IRS must first establish a case that
tax fraud was committed or planned. It must then request the
Federal Tax Administration for a Swiss court order compelling the
bank to disclose its information. An independent Federal Tax
Administration investigation must confirm the IRS charge that the
case constitutes "fraud or the like" within the meaning of the Swiss
tax law and the 1951 Double Taxation Convention. Any turnover
order must be preceded by notice to the parties and the opportunity
to be heard on the merits of the case. Finally, the statute of
limitations must not have expired in either country.
2. The Swiss-American Treaty for Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters of May 25, 1973. The two governments have re-
cently negotiated a complicated treaty for mutual legal assistance
which, when ratified, will partially meet American policy goals
while preserving the fundamental right to financial privacy in
Switzerland.122 In the past, American requests for judicial assist-
ance from Swiss courts had been by letters rogatory, transmitted via
diplomatic channels. Extensive uniform assistance in this manner
was not possible as a consequence of the Swiss cantonal law system
and a general hesitancy to depart from traditional Swiss law on
financial privacy."'
Discussion for this treaty began slowly and proceeded inter-
mittently over a four and one-half year period from November,
1968 to May, 1973. After the Vinson visit to Bern, formal talks
were held in Washington in April, 1969, and in Bern in June and
July, 1969. The United States was represented by officials from
the Justice, State, and Treasury Departments and the Securities and
121. 71-1 U.S. TAx. CAs. 86,566 (Swiss Fed. Sup. Ct. 1970).
122. Treaty with the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, May 25, 1973 [reproduced in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERILS 916 (1973)]
[hereinafter cited as Treaty]. Noted in 15 HARv. INT'L L.J. 349 (1974), 7
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 103 (1974), 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 469 (1974).
123. Comment, Secret Swiss Bank Accounts: Uses, Abuses, and Attempts at
Control, 39 FoRDHAM L. REv. 500, 508 (1971).
1976
47
Kelly: United States Foreign Policy: Efforts to Penetrate Bank Secrecy i
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1976
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Exchange Commission. Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson,
of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, led the delegation.
These discussions focused on several proposals for a draft treaty
which had been prepared by the Justice Department.
The American negotiators initially requested Swiss help in
locating the bank deposits of all American tax evaders and organ-
ized crime figures. The Swiss, while willing in principle to assist,
were understandably reluctant to compromise their views on fiscal
privacy in matters they did not consider crimes (such as tax
evasion), simply to correct an American problem. The Swiss
Bankers Association had previously endorsed the efforts of the
Swiss government to cooperate with other nations in the interna-
tional fight against crime, but insisted that such help be confined to
those crimes common to both Switzerland and the country seeking
aid. l2 4  The major compromise came when the United States
dropped its request for information on "tax evaders" and the Swiss
agreed to define "organized crime with .international repercussions"
as a common crime. Drafting efforts continued in Bern and
Washington during 1970.
Although the parties agreed to a draft of the legal assistance
agreement as early as August 17, 1970, the Treaty was not formal-
ly signed until May 25, 1973. During the period since the signing,
the treaty has been creeping slowly through the Swiss ratification
process, while the State Department has recently submitted the
Treaty to the United State Senate for advice and consent. 125
Several factors account for the delays in both the negotiation
and ratification stages. Preliminary talks were slowed by the
fundamental and substantial differences between the legal systems
of the two nations. There was considerable time spent in search of
a common basis upon which a judicial assistance treaty could be
built. Inexperience also intensified and prolonged the negotia-
tions. This Treaty is the first United States treaty to deal with
criminal matters, and while the Swiss have negotiated such treaties
in the past with other civil law European nations, this was their
124. Note, Secret Foreign Bank Accounts, 6 TEXAs INT'L L.F. 105, 130 n.132
(1970).
125. The "hurry-up-and-wait" pattern seems quite curious in view of the ini-
tial urgency with which the United States viewed the need for the Treaty. The
two year delay between signature and ratification, while not uncommon, causes
one to wonder about the necessity of two weeks of day and night bargaining in
Bern in June and July, 1969. See N.Y. Times, July 8, 1969, at 24, col. 1.
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first encounter with an Anglo-American criminal system. At least
one report has suggested that the delay stemmed from the Swiss
desire to finesse a "package deal" whereby the Swiss would ap-
prove the Treaty in return for an American repeal of the 1971
import surcharge of 10% and the exclusion of foreign-produced
equipment from the investment tax credit.
126
Delays since May, 1973, are largely attributable to the Swiss
ratification process. The original talks were conducted in English,
and time was consumed in translating the complicated text of the
treaty into French, Italian and German, the three official Swiss
languages. One report indicated that the Swiss Bankers Associa-
tion was "fighting a rear guard action" over the enabling legislation
which would give domestic effect to the treaty. 127  The United
States has delayed only because the State Department desired to
keep pace with the Swiss.
It is now possible that the Treaty could take effect in 1977.128
The Swiss Nationalrat ratified the Treaty in November, 1974, and
the Standerat ratified it in June, 1975. The Swiss domestic
enabling legislation passed in October, 1975 and took effect in
January, 1976. The two governments exchanged notes of mutual
understanding with respect to the taking of oaths in Switzerland
in December, 1975. The State Department forwarded the Treaty
to the Senate in February, 1976, where it was given considera-
tion by the Foreign Relations Committee. No floor opposition
to its passage is expected.
The Treaty calls for compulsory mutual assistance with re-
spect to the investigation and prosecution of thirty-five enumerated
crimes, most of which have nothing to do with white collar offenses
or bank secrecy. Yet, as has been indicated, the controversy during
the negotiations centered on the issues of organized crime and
access to Swiss bank information by American prosecutors and tax
officials.
Articles 6 through 8 of the Treaty deal specifically with
126. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1971, at 11, col. 1. The import surcharge was
lifted in January, 1972, for reasons unrelated to the Treaty.
127. N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1974, at 61, col. 1. The intricacies of Swiss
treaty ratification are explained in Looper, The Treaty Power in Switzerland, 7
AM. J. Comp. L. 178, 181 (1958).
128. Article 41(2) of the Treaty provides that it will take effect 180 days
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organized crime.129 The requesting state must have probable
cause to believe that a person is involved in organized criminal
activitity and must be unable to prosecute the suspect without the
requested information. The requested state reserves the right to
satisfy itself that both conditions have been fulfilled. Thus, if the
Justice Department can persuade the Swiss Ministry of Justice and
Police that both conditions exist, then the Ministry will request a
court order to examine the individual's Swiss bank records for
turnover to the United States, even if tax evasion is the only offense
involved.
Article 5(1) permits the requested state to maintain strict
control over the uses to which the requesting state may put any
information obtained pursuant to a specific request. Use in pro-
ceedings relating to another offense or investigation in the request-
ing state is forbidden. The Treaty describes with clarity those
areas to which it does not apply3 ° and those areas in which mutual
assistance is discretionary.' A strong arbitration clause insures
successful operation of the Treaty if disputes arise.
32
The benefits arising from the Treaty are considerable. Under
Swiss constitutional law, treaties concluded by the Confederation
have the status of federal law and take precedence over conflicting
cantonal law."33 Thus, for the first time, the Treaty will make
available meaningful judicial assistance to the United States from
129. The Treaty defines "organized criminal groups" as: an association
or group of persons combined together for a substantial or indefinite
period for the purposes of obtaining monetary or commercial gains or
profits for itself or for others, wholly or in part by illegal means, and of
protecting its illegal activities against criminal prosecution and which, in
carrying out its purposes, in a methodical and systematic manner: (a)
. . . commits or threatens to commit acts of violence . . . and (b) . . .
either: (1) strives to obtain influence in politics or commerce . . . or
(2) associates itself. . . with. . . similar associations or groups ....
Treaty, supra note 123, art. 6(3).
130. The Treaty specifically excludes involuntary extraditions, enforcement of
criminal judgments rendered in the other state, political offenses, various military
offenses, antitrust or cartel violations, and custom or tax violations that are not
committed in the furtherance of organized criminal purposes. See id., art. 2.
131. The Treaty allows the requested state to refuse assistance if its sov-
ereignty, national security, or similar interests would be compromised, or if the
subject of the request is not involved in organized crime and has been acquitted
or convicted in the requesting state for a substantially similar offense. See id.,
art. 3.
132. Id., art. 39(2)-(7).
133. Note, Treaty with Switzerland Affects Banking Secrecy Law-Provisions
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Switzerland, while eliminating at little cost to either, a major source
of friction between the two nations. It is unlikely that the United
States will frequently be called upon to render criminal assistance
to Switzerland. At the same time, the Swiss have conceded very
little. An exception to bank secrecy laws has always been recog-
nized to compel a banker to produce evidence or testify upon
judicial request. 134  By making compulsory measures available
under the Treaty, the Swiss have modified their domestic law only
with respect to tax evasion by organized criminals.
Critics of the Treaty have raised a number of objections. First,
a bilateral Swiss-American treaty does little to plug the loopholes
which frustrate American criminal investigations in the world's
many remaining bank secrecy jurisdictions. Second, the lengthy
negotiation and ratification process has given ample warning to
those organized criminals potentially affected by the Treaty to
move their funds out of Switzerland. Third, the United States has
failed to gain Swiss assistance in the detection of those tax and
securities law violators who are not "organized criminals".
On balance, however, these criticisms seem harsh. The Swiss
concessions, however small, can benefit United States law enforce-
ment. The slow treaty-making process is understandable in view
of the parties' inexperience with so many variables, and perhaps
the instant Treaty will serve as a model to expedite future negotia-
tions with other nations. Finally, Switzerland is unquestionably
the most important of the world's bank secrecy jurisdictions. To
the extent that the Treaty will block access by organized crime to
Swiss bank secrecy, it is a major foreign policy accomplishment.
V. CONCLUSION
In the last thirty-five years, American policy towards Swiss
bank secrecy has generated input from a variety of executive
departments, independent regulatory agencies, the Congress and
federal courts. The only common denominator during the period
has been ideological, with the source of the policy coming from
New Deal Democrats and their successors.
An early proponent of compelling broad Swiss disclosures was
Henry Morgenthau whose department exercised sweeping powers
during the Roosevelt years, due largely to his close personal friend-
134. Mueller, supra note 2, at 361, 362-63, 366.
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ship with Franklin Roosevelt. Bank secrecy policy under his
direction was marked by inter-departmental bickering at home,
moralistic preaching abroad, and economic warfare tactics against
a neutral nation which remained in effect eighteen months after the
real wartime enemy had surrendered. Swiss-American relations
suffered from this approach, and the hoped-for results were mini-
mal. Policy moderation returned only during the Truman Admin-
istration, as the State Department emerged, replacing the Treasury
as the dominant force in shaping economic foreign policy.
Post-1965 efforts to penetrate bank secrecy have differed
markedly, with the major tie to the past being the Morgenthau
name. American policy makers have meticulously documented
their case "against" Swiss bank secrecy before proceeding, and
inter-agency cooperation has been uniform. Negotiations with the
Swiss, while hard-fought, have been courteous. It is unclear
whether this turnabout in American attitude reflects learning from
past errors, or simply realignment of bargaining positions to favor
the Swiss. In either case, with the Treaty ratification pending in
1976, it appears that the United States will have available the tools
necessary to prevent Swiss bank secrecy from frustrating American
law enforcement efforts on a large scale.
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